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The Revolutionary War Prize Cases and  
the Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction 
DEIRDRE MASK† 
PAUL MACMAHON†† 
  
Why did the Framers give the federal courts diversity 
jurisdiction? This Article brings to light a crucial but 
forgotten source of inspiration for diversity jurisdiction, 
showing that previous explanations ignore the Framers’ 
experience judging prize case appeals during the 
Revolutionary War. Scholars have largely rejected the view 
that the Framers anticipated state bias in diversity 
litigation, arguing, for example, that diversity jurisdiction 
was designed to provide a high-quality venue for commercial 
disputes. Yet placing the Framers’ decision in the context of 
their lived experience as judges in contentious “Prize Cases” 
during the Revolutionary War rehabilitates the geographic 
bias theory. During the War, the Continental Congress relied 
heavily on privateers—private citizens, who, with the 
financial support of individual states or Congress, were 
authorized to capture British ships. At George Washington’s 
urging, the Continental Congress set up an adjudicatory 
committee within Congress itself, the Committee on Appeals, 
to resolve appeals from prize cases in the state courts. The 
Framers’ taste of judicial work exposed them to contentious 
interstate disputes—a preview of what diversity litigation 
would look like in the new country. We argue that this 
experience, almost entirely ignored by contemporary 
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scholars, directly inspired the otherwise perplexing decision 
to include diversity jurisdiction in Article III. 
INTRODUCTION 
One hundred years after the Constitution was ratified, 
James Bradley Thayer posed a difficult question: why 
diversity jurisdiction?1 “Why is it,” Thayer asked, “that a 
United States court is given this duty of administering the 
law of another jurisdiction? Why did the States allow it? Why 
was it important that the United States should have it?”2 
These questions have been so enduring because the Framers 
themselves failed to answer them. Henry Friendly, whose 
influential 1928 article sought to answer Thayer’s questions, 
pointed out that the “letters and papers of the men who were 
to frame the Constitution” did not indicate that the Framers 
had “given any large amount of thought to the construction 
of a federal judiciary.”3  
Nor were the records of the Constitutional Convention 
“fruitful to a student of the [D]iversity [C]lause.”4 “Certain it 
is,” he concluded, that diversity jurisdiction “had not bulked 
large in their eyes.”5 Turning to colonial court records for 
insight, Friendly found no evidence of prejudice against 
citizens of other colonies to support the standard view that 
fear of geographic bias prompted diversity jurisdiction.6 From 
this, Friendly concluded that diversity “was not a product of 
difficulties that had been acutely felt under the 
  
 1. Diversity jurisdiction is located in Article III of the Constitution. U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to . . . Controversies between 
. . . citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands 
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof and 
foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects.”). 
 2. James Bradley Thayer, The Case of Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
311, 316 (1891). 
 3. Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. 
REV. 483, 484 (1928). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.  
 6. See id. at 492-93. 
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Confederation.”7 Instead, he proposed that diversity 
jurisdiction arose out of “a vague feeling that the new courts 
would be strong courts, creditors’ courts, business men’s 
courts.”8  
In an article published later that year, Felix Frankfurter, 
Friendly’s mentor, agreed that diversity jurisdiction did not 
spring from any actual experience of geographic bias.9 
“Plainly enough, this phase of the ‘judicial power of the 
United States’ did not grow out of any serious defects of the 
Confederacy nor did it anticipate glaring evils,” he wrote.10 
“The available records disclose no particular grievance 
against state tribunals for discrimination against litigants 
from without.”11 John Frank similarly concluded that 
diversity was based on “a gloomy anticipation” of prejudice 
against out-of-state commercial parties “rather than an 
experienced evil.”12  
But what was the actual experience of the Framers? 
Conspicuously absent or sidelined from these accounts of the 
origins of diversity jurisdiction is the Framers’ direct 
experience serving as judges in the Revolutionary War “Prize 
Cases.”13 Beginning in 1776, the Second Continental 
  
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 498. 
 9. Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States 
and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 520 (1928). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.; Julius Goebel made this same point about Article III as a whole, 
concluding that “[t]he judiciary was subjected to much less critical working over 
than the other departments of government . . . . [I]t is difficult to divest oneself of 
the impression that . . . provision for a national judiciary was a matter of 
theoretical compulsion rather than of practical necessity.” JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., 
1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 205-06 (1971). 
 12. John P. Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7, 9 
(1963). More specifically, Frank argued that Congress predicted commercial 
activity and trade “on an unknown but vast scale . . . . If the Founding Fathers 
could anticipate the industrial and commercial revolution, already beginning, 
they could anticipate some of the obstacles to the success of the concomitant 
business enterprise.” John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial 
System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 27 (1948) [hereinafter Frank, Historical 
Bases].  
 13. The Revolutionary War Prize Cases—the focus of this Article—are not to 
be confused with the more famous Civil War Prize Cases, in which the U.S. 
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Congress determined disputes involving privateers, private 
individuals or ships authorized14 by the government to attack 
and capture enemy ships in exchange for a share of the 
bounty.15 Usually seeking out merchant ships, privateers 
tirelessly attacked the British during the Revolutionary War, 
motivated by a powerful cocktail of greed and patriotism. 
Because it was not always clear whether a captured ship was 
British, American, or neutral, and because more than one 
privateer sometimes participated in a capture, disputes over 
the spoils arose early and often.  
During the Revolutionary War, state admiralty courts 
adjudicated these disputes in the first instance, but Congress 
sought to oversee their work. Similar to its English 
equivalent,16 the initial appeals “court” was actually a 
committee within Congress, known as the “Committee on 
Appeals.”17 Over thirty-seven members of Congress, 
including John Adams, Edmund Randolph, and, most 
importantly, the key architects of the future federal 
judiciary—James Wilson and Oliver Ellsworth18—served as 
  
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of President Lincoln’s pre-war 
blockade of Southern ports. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 698-99 
(1863). 
 14. The document that gave a privateer his commission was called a “letter of 
marque.” See EDGAR STANTON MACLAY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRIVATEERS 7 
(1899). 
 15. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a privateer as a “vessel owned, equipped, 
and armed by one or more private individuals, and duly commissioned by a 
belligerent power to go on cruises and make war upon the enemy, usually by 
preying on his commerce.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (6th ed. 1990). For a 
background on privateering in Britain and the early United States, see Theodore 
M. Cooperstein, Letters of Marque and Reprisal: The Constitutional Law and 
Practice of Privateering, 40 J. MAR. L. & COM. 221-26 (2009). 
 16. In Britain, the Lords Commissioners for Prize Appeals were located within 
the Privy Council, though in the eighteenth century common law judges often 
participated in the hearing of the appeals. HENRY J. BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST 
FEDERAL COURT 18 (1977); see also GOEBEL, supra note 11, at 151 (“Incongruous 
though it may seem, the resemblance between the earnest republicans who made 
up the Standing Committee and the grandees commissioned as Lords 
Commissioners of Appeal is very striking. Both bodies were similarly constituted; 
both performed similar tasks and faced similar difficulties.”). 
 17. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 40.  
 18. Id. at 330.  
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judges on the Committee, deciding appeals from the state 
courts. Others, including Alexander Hamilton,19 practiced as 
lawyers in prize disputes; James Madison20 worked behind 
the scenes to improve the functioning of the appellate 
process. Ultimately, Congress handed its jurisdiction over to 
a new, freestanding court, the Court of Appeals in Cases of 
Capture—our first federal court.21 
Few articles engage meaningfully with the Prize Cases 
or their influence on the shape of the federal judiciary.22 The 
few that have done so generally only attribute their influence 
to the decision to entrust admiralty jurisdiction to the federal 
courts, and the power to issue “letters of marque”23 to 
Congress.24 Several scholars, particularly in the late 
  
 19. Id. at 337. 
 20. Id. at 127. 
 21. The Prize Cases were not, however, the only judicial experience the 
Continental Congress had. Congress also decided territorial disputes between 
states, which surely also informed its view of litigation between states. But, as 
Robert Steamer has noted, “the arrangements provided [for land disputes] were 
temporary and haphazard.” Robert J. Steamer, The Legal and Political Genesis 
of the Supreme Court, 77 POL. SCI. Q. 546, 562 (1962). 
 22. For example, two recent articles exploring the sources of Article III barely 
mention the Prize Cases at all. See, e.g., Robert L. Jones, Finishing A Friendly 
Argument: The Jury and the Historical Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 997, 1001 (2007) (mentioning the Court of Appeals in Cases of 
Capture as the “only national court” prior to the ratification of the Constitution); 
James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1634 (2011) (mentioning the Court of Appeals in Cases of 
Capture only once in passing, despite the article’s close attention to James 
Wilson, one of the most active participants in the Prize Cases). 
 23. “The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o declare war, grant letters of 
marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land or water . . . .” 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also id. § 10 (“No State shall enter into any treaty, 
alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal . . . .”). 
 24. See Frank, Historical Bases, supra note 12, at 9 (“The experience of the 
Confederation convinced virtually every conscientious patriot of the 1780s that 
the admiralty jurisdiction ought to be totally, effectively, and completely in the 
hands of the national government, and an extended search has not revealed a 
criticism from any contemporary source of the clause of the constitution granting 
federal admiralty jurisdiction.”). Wythe Holt, who extensively detailed local bias 
in the Prize Cases, also discusses them in the framework of admiralty. Wythe 
Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention 
of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1427-30 (1989) [hereinafter Holt, The 
Invention of the Federal Courts] (explaining that the men involved in the federal 
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, have 
acknowledged the importance of the Court of Appeals in 
influencing other aspects of Article III, contending that the 
Prize Cases helped spark a shared understanding of the need 
for a national judiciary,25 contributed to the separation of the 
legislative and judicial branches of government,26 influenced 
the breadth of congressional war powers,27 and played a 
significant role in the designation of a single Supreme 
Court.28 This Article seeks to highlight another legacy of the 
  
admiralty court “presumably understood the problems of localism that the 
national experience with admiralty had presented during the Confederation and 
shared the general attitude of 1789 that admiralty jurisdiction should be an 
exclusively national matter.”). 
 25. See, e.g., Steamer, supra note 21, at 560 (“There is no doubt that this action 
by a national authority to standardize admiralty procedure is a clear antecedent 
for a national judiciary.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court 
Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. 
PA. L. REV. 741, 757 (1984) [hereinafter Clinton, Guided Quest]. Interestingly, the 
Articles of Confederation, promulgated after the Committee on Appeals had been 
operating for several years, specifically stated that “no member of Congress” could 
be appointed to the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture. See ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION of 1777, art. IX. 
 27. See Ingrid Wuerth, The Captures Clause, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1720 
(2009). 
 28. J. Franklin Jameson, The Predecessor of the Supreme Court, in ESSAYS IN 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FORMATIVE PERIOD 
1775-1789, 1, 5 (J. Franklin Jameson ed., 1889); J.C. Bancroft Davis, Federal 
Courts Prior to the Adoption of the Constitution, 131 U.S. app. xix, xxxiv (1889); 
Frank, Historical Bases, supra note 12, at 28; William F. Swindler, Seedtime of 
an American Judiciary: From Independence to the Constitution, 17 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 503, 519 (1976); Sidney Teiser, The Genesis of the Supreme Court, 25 VA. 
L. REV. 398, 400 (1938). More recently, Robert Clinton acknowledged the vast 
significance of the Prize Cases. See Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 26, at 757 
(“[The Prize Case] experience demonstrated, however, the value of a court, like 
the Court of Appeals, separate from the national legislature. The experience 
highlighted, among other things, the need to avoid the ponderous delay and 
inconvenience created by the ad hoc establishment of hearing tribunals, the 
importance of the national disposition of certain judicial cases to orderly 
diplomatic relations and to the domestic harmony of the states, the need for 
judges who could decide such questions independent of any obligations owed to 
the states that appointed them, and the extreme difficulty of enforcing national 
judgments affecting important state interest.”). Clinton, however, does not 
address the Prize Cases at length, noting that “[t]he judicial experience of the 
confederation is detailed elsewhere.” Id. 
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Prize Cases: diversity jurisdiction.29  
Modern accounts of the sources of diversity jurisdiction 
gloss over this judicial experience, focusing instead on the 
economic motives of the Framers. These theories of diversity 
jurisdiction look, for example, to the failure of the states to 
open their courts to British merchants as the Treaty of Paris 
required,30 the Framers’ desire to counteract state anti-
creditor legislation,31 and the need for strong commercial 
courts. Moreover, in an intriguing recent article, Robert 
Jones contends that the Diversity Clause was actually 
motivated by the Framers’ concern over the quality of federal 
  
 29. To our knowledge, this Article is the first to explore the relationship 
between diversity jurisdiction and the Prize Cases in any depth, but it is not the 
first to note it. Although this Article focuses on the Prize Cases’ influence on the 
creation of a single Supreme Court, Sidney Teiser mentioned the relationship 
between diversity jurisdiction and the Prize Cases in his 1938 article, The Genesis 
of The Supreme Court. See Teiser, supra note 28, at 415 (noting that the members 
of the Constitutional Convention “were fully acquainted with the desirability of 
establishing a court having jurisdiction over disputes arising between different 
states, and between citizens of different states—at least in respect to captures.”). 
Henry Bourguignon, who wrote the definitive history of the Prize Cases, also 
briefly mentioned the Prize Cases’ influence on a number of different aspects of 
federal jurisdiction, including diversity. See BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 332 
(“The years of limping along with the congressional appellate prize court had 
shown that many problems arose if state courts could determine finally cases of 
captures, cases involving foreign or out-of-state litigants, or cases in which 
national peace and harmony were at stake.”).  
 30. See, e.g., Wythe Holt, The Origins of Alienage Jurisdiction, 14 OKLA. CITY 
UNIV. L. REV. 547, 552 (1989) [hereinafter Holt, The Origins of Alienage 
Jurisdiction] (explaining that “[t]he Convention was worried about refusal by 
state courts to uphold a previously ratified treaty or treaties”); see also Charles 
Anthony Smith, Credible Commitments and the Early American Supreme Court, 
42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 75, 77 (2008) (arguing “that a significant rationale for the 
jurisdiction and design of the [Supreme] Court was to establish a credible 
commitment to uphold trade agreements and resolve trade disputes with other 
nations.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise 
of Legal Positivism, and A Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 
79, 98 (1993) (noting that “[t]he prevailing perception appears to have been that 
diversity courts were to have some freedom to apply laws independent of state 
laws, particularly with regard to anticreditor legislation.”). 
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jurors; federal courts would have the power to select a 
“superior class of individuals” to serve on federal juries.32  
This Article does not intend to supplant the work of other 
scholars in this area entirely. These scholars have provided 
significant evidence that the Framers were motivated in part 
by a desire to help creditors and merchants. We wish, 
however, to reveal a key oversight in previous accounts, 
which have largely examined the sources of diversity 
jurisdiction without considering the lived judicial experience 
of the Framers themselves.33 More generally, we seek to 
reacquaint legal scholars with the Prize Cases, a rich source 
of material for the historical legacy of diversity jurisdiction 
and Article III as a whole. 
Viewing diversity jurisdiction through the lens of the 
Prize Cases teaches us three key lessons. First, previous 
scholars have been wrong to claim that the Framers34 had 
little actual experience that suggested a need to give 
diversity jurisdiction to the federal courts. From their Prize 
Case experience, the Framers had ample reason to worry 
  
 32. Jones, supra note 22, at 1086. For more on Jones’s argument, see infra 
notes 202-06 and accompanying text. 
 33. Legal historians have long struggled with the difficulties of interpreting 
the Framers’ intent. As Wythe Holt has said, “[w]e tend to think differently, to 
think in terms of a separate, neutral legal realm of constitutionally prescribed 
federal court jurisdiction, a realm where structural dictates are everything and 
contingent political pressures are meaningless. It is a mode of thinking which the 
generation of Framers did not use in any systematic fashion.” Holt, The Origins 
of Alienage Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 548. See also Clinton, Guided Quest, 
supra note 26, at 747 n.1 (“In searching for such original understanding, the legal 
historian must also always remember that she is looking at the primary historical 
data through lenses that have been clouded by contemporary issues and by the 
perspective of intervening legal, social, and political history. Thus, in this sense 
the legal historian’s quest for original understanding may never truly replicate 
the framers’ understanding.”). 
 34. By “Framers,” we mean the men who attended the Constitutional 
Convention. Because not all the members of the Constitutional Convention were 
members of the Continental Congress, the men who witnessed the Prize Case 
experience were not precisely the same ones who structured the Constitution. 
However, four-fifths of the men at the Convention were also in Congress. See 
Teiser, supra note 28, at 415. This is not, however, to imply that everyone involved 
in the Prize Cases supported diversity jurisdiction, or even the Constitution, 
though most did. See BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 330 n.23 (listing as 
examples of opponents Samuel Chase, Luther Martin, and William Paca).  
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that state courts would be biased against parties from other 
states.  
Second, the Prize Cases suggested to the Framers how 
federal courts could remedy this geographic bias, inspiring 
the Framers to give the Supreme Court broad appellate 
jurisdiction. But the Prize Cases also taught the Framers 
that appellate jurisdiction over interstate disputes would not 
suffice to combat the problem of interstate bias. Throughout 
the War, colonial legislatures and courts disregarded 
Congress’s jurisdiction, either restricting the right of appeal 
to the congressional court, or, as exemplified in a few famous 
cases, refusing to enforce Congress’s decisions at all. The 
Judiciary Act of 1789 responded to these problems by 
creating the inferior courts contemplated in the Constitution, 
vesting original jurisdiction over diversity cases in those 
courts, and providing for federal marshals to enforce the 
decisions of those courts.35  
Third, the Prize Case experience shows why diversity 
litigation was considered essential by so many of the 
Framers. Providing a national forum for these classes of 
disputes could function as a means of avoiding national 
conflicts with parties both foreign and domestic.  
The evidence that the Prize Cases inspired diversity 
jurisdiction (and other aspects of Article III) is powerful. 
True, the Framers rarely mentioned the Cases specifically in 
their debates. Yet the Framers most involved in drafting and 
supporting Article III and the Judiciary Act—James Wilson, 
Oliver Ellsworth, and James Madison—were among those 
most deeply involved in arguing, deciding, and enforcing the 
decisions of the Committee and the Court of Appeals. Even 
those members of Congress who did not serve in the judicial 
role debated and voted on key resolutions regarding the 
Committee, and, later, the Court of Appeals.  
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a general 
overview of the Prize Cases, the congressional Committee on 
Appeals, and the Committee’s successor, the Court of 
Appeals in Cases of Capture. Part II shows how the Prize 
  
 35. The first Congress imposed a five hundred dollar “amount in controversy” 
for diversity suits, likely responding to complaints that litigants with small claims 
would be dragged from their homes to answer in federal courts. See JUDICIARY 
ACT of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 78 (1789). 
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Cases provide strong support for the “geographic bias” theory 
of the Constitution’s grant of diversity jurisdiction, refuting 
Friendly’s claim that geographic bias was not a significant 
influence on Article III.  
In Part III, we delve more specifically into how the Prize 
Cases taught federal courts how to remedy these prejudices. 
This Part extends the analysis to the Judiciary Act’s grant of 
original jurisdiction over diversity cases to the inferior 
federal courts, focusing attention on how federal trial courts 
provided a remedy for the kinds of enforcement problems 
encountered by the first federal tribunals in the Prize Cases. 
In Part IV, we explain why the influence of the Prize Cases 
is not limited to admiralty alone. And finally, in Part V, we 
demonstrate how the Prize Cases showed the Framers the 
need for diversity jurisdiction not only as a safeguard for the 
nation’s economic future, but also as a means of avoiding real 
crisis in the new nation.  
I. BACKGROUND ON THE PRIZE CASES 
A. Adjudicating the Prize Cases 
When George Washington wrote a letter to Congress in 
1775 about his troubles with the privateers, he likely did not 
suspect he was pouring the foundation for the new country’s 
federal judiciary.36 Washington was harassed by complaints 
from the American privateers, private citizens who had taken 
to the sea to capture British ships. The practice of 
privateering was not new; the British had long used 
privateers when they needed to supplement their standing 
military force.37  
  
 36. Letters from George Washington to the President of Congress (Nov. 11, 
1775), reprinted in 2 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: BEING HIS 
CORRESPONDENCE, ADDRESSES, MESSAGES, AND OTHER PAPERS, OFFICIAL AND 
PRIVATE 155 (Jared Sparks ed., 1834) [hereinafter Letters from George 
Washington]. For more general background of what led to the letters, see 
BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 43-45.  
 37. See Matthew P. Harrington, The Legacy of the Colonial Vice-Admiralty 
Courts (Part II), 27 J. MAR. L. & COM. 323, 332 (1996) (explaining that the “arming 
of private vessels was an absolutely vital means of increasing the size of a 
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Privateering was essential to the success of the 
Revolutionary War; privateers captured or destroyed three 
times as many vessels as the tiny Continental Navy.38 
Writing to the Marine Committee, Congressman Silas Deane 
boasted that privateering “effectually alarmed England, 
prevented the great fair at Chester, occasioned insurance to 
rise, and even deterred the English merchants from shipping 
goods in English vessels at any rate of insurance.”39 An 
Englishman wrote from Jamaica in 1777 that “from sixty 
vessels that departed from Ireland not above twenty-five 
arrived in this and neighboring islands, the others, it is 
thought, being all taken by American privateers. God knows, 
if this American war continues much longer we shall all die 
with hunger.”40  
American privateers hunted down ships on the other side 
of the Atlantic too. English Whig politician Horace Walpole 
wrote that, “American privateers infest our coasts; they keep 
  
country’s naval forces in an era when maintenance of a large standing military 
force was not possible.”). 
 38. See MACLAY, supra note 14, at viii (pointing out that the navy captured 196 
vessels, while privateers captured about 600). The number of captured American 
ships may even have been higher than this. As Maclay also reports, an alderman 
testified at the House of Lords that “the number of ships lost by capture or 
destroyed by American privateers since the beginning of the [W]ar was seven 
hundred and thirty-three, whose cargoes were computed to be worth over ten 
million dollars.” Id. at xiii. 
 39. Id. at xii. Other examples abound. John Adams, for example, complained 
that the success of the privateers was not sufficiently reported in the press. He 
wrote in 1777: 
One of the most [s]killful, determined, persevering, and successful 
[e]ngagements that have ever happened upon the [s]eas, have been 
performed by American [p]rivateers against the [p]rivateers from New 
York. They have happened upon the [c]oasts and seas of America, which 
are now very well swept of New York privateers, and have seldom been 
properly described and published even there, and much more seldomer 
ever inserted in any of the [g]azettes of Europe, whether it is because the 
actions of single and small [v]essels and these [p]rivateers are not 
thought worth publishing, or whether it has been for [w]ant of some 
[p]erson to procure it to be done.  
Letter from John Adams to Edmé Jacques Genet, The Adams Papers Digital 
Editions, MASS. HISTORICAL SOC’Y (May 3, 1780), available at 
https://www.masshist.org/publications/apde/portia.php?id=PJA09d168.  
 40. MACLAY, supra note 14, at xi-xiii. 
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Scotland in alarms, and even the harbor of Dublin has been 
newly strengthened with cannon.”41 Over the course of the 
War, 1697 privateer ships manned by 58,400 men roamed the 
seas.42  
Privateering men grew wealthy.43 Most American 
privateers “devoted themselves mainly to commerce 
destroying,” capturing merchant ships bearing rich cargo.44 
As just one example, American privateers captured a ship 
from Africa carrying “four hundred and fifty negroes, some 
thousand weight of gold dust, and a great many elephant 
teeth . . . worth [an estimated] twenty thousand pounds.”45 
And this at a time when the average wage in America was 
eight pounds a year.46 It soon became difficult to attract men 
to the army from the sea.47 
  
 41. Letter from Horace Walpole to Horace Mann (July 17, 1777), reprinted in 
24 THE YALE EDITION OF HORACE WALPOLE’S CORRESPONDENCE, 315-316                 
(W.S. Lewis, ed. 1937-1983), available at http://images.library.yale.edu/
hwcorrespondence/page.asp?vol=24&seq=331&type=b; see also Letter from John 
Adams to James Warren, The Adams Papers Digital Editions, MASS. HISTORICAL 
SOC’Y (Mar. 31, 1777), available at http://www.masshist.org/publications/apde/
portia.php?id=PJA05d079 (“[A]ll the Ports of France and Spain, and Italy, and all 
the Ports in the Mediterranean, excepting Portugal, are open to our Privateers 
and Merchant Ships.”). 
 42. Randolph B. Campbell, The Case of the “Three Friends”: An Incident in 
Maritime Regulation During the Revolutionary War, 74 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIO. 190, 
193 (1966). The Northern states—Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland and 
Connecticut—account for the vast majority of these commissions. North Carolina 
apparently issued none. Id. 
 43. John Adams spoke of dining with a Mr. Bleakly after the War, whom he 
said “made a very large fortune during the War by privateering, and since the 
Peace, came to Europe to enjoy it.” Diary of John Quincy Adams, The Adams 
Papers Digital Editions, MASS. HISTORICAL SOC’Y (Mar. 5, 1785), available at 
http://www.masshist.org/publications/apde/portia.php?id=DQA01d713. 
 44.  EVARTS BOUTELL GREENE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY 
467 (1922). Note, however, that many privateers later joined the navy. See 
MACLAY, supra note 14, at 79 (noting that “some sixty of our most formidable 
privateers were commanded by men who were, or soon afterward became, 
captains in the navy.”). 
 45. MACLAY, supra note 14, at xiii. 
 46. M. RUTH KELLY, THE OLMSTEAD CASE: PRIVATEERS, PROPERTY, AND POLITICS 
IN PENNSYLVANIA 151 n.39 (2005). 
 47. See GREENE, supra note 44, at 467.  
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But as with most profitable ventures, the privateers’ 
success came with bitter disputes. A captured ship was 
ordinarily taken to a port, then registered with the local 
admiralty court.48 The profits from the sale of the ship and 
cargo were ultimately distributed between the privateer and 
the state or the Continental Congress—whichever 
government had given the ship its commission.49 But 
capturing a ship was often only the beginning of a long legal 
battle. The ship’s owners might deny that the ship was an 
enemy vessel and seek to recover the Prize. In addition, 
privateers from different states sometimes claimed to have 
captured the same ship, forcing litigation over the relative 
shares of the Prize money.50 
The issues these disputes raised were decided under 
international law.51 In England, privateering disputes had 
been heard in the Vice-Admiralty courts since the fourteenth-
century.52 In the colonies, similar Vice-Admiralty courts were 
eventually established, and these courts heard privateering 
disputes arising from eighteenth-century British wars.53 But 
once the Revolution broke out, the colonial Vice-Admiralty 
courts—which had been particularly hated by the 
  
 48. When privateers first brought a ship into port, “the judge of the admiralty 
or vice-admiralty [court] was to complete the preparatory examination of the key 
members of the crew of the captured ship and he was to issue monition or public 
notice to all parties concerned in the trial of this vessel.” BOURGUIGNON, supra 
note 16, at 139. Privateers in America and Jamaica then filed a “libel,” a “highly 
stylized bill” that functioned as a complaint. Id. at 141. Evidence was then taken, 
with interrogatories often prepared by the captors for the crew of the captured 
ship. Id. at 139, 143. 
 49. See id. at 47. 
 50. Teiser, supra note 28, at 400 (explaining that “[i]t often occurred that ships 
owned by inhabitants of the different colonies, and sometimes also by the Colonies 
and the Congress, all contributed to a capture. Under such circumstances, 
disputes over prize moneys arose, which were not satisfactorily settled by the 
courts of the state wherein . . . the prize was brought.”). 
 51. For an overview of substantive prize law during the Revolution, see 
BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 238-96. 
 52. See id. at 4. 
 53. See id. at 22-26. 
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colonists54—could not be counted upon to resolve the 
inevitable and contentious disputes that privateering 
produced.55  
At the start of the Revolutionary War, Prize disputes 
were in General Washington’s hands alone. Having other 
things to do, Washington wrote to the Continental Congress 
asking to be relieved of the burden of adjudicating these 
cases. Might Congress set up a court to resolve them? 
“Whatever the mode is which [Congress is] pleased to adopt, 
there is an absolute necessity of its being speedily 
determined on; for I cannot spare [t]ime from [m]ilitary 
[a]ffairs, to give proper attention to these matters.”56 
B. The Committee on Appeals 
But instead of establishing a special trial court, as 
Washington had suggested, Congress directed the states to 
set up their own courts to decide Prize disputes. Unusually, 
Congress resolved that Prize Cases be decided by jury, a 
significant deviation from English practice in admiralty 
cases.57 But Congress followed English precedent in another 
  
 54. See Ingrid Wuerth, The Captures Clause, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1720 
(2009) (explaining that the “[Vice-Admiralty] courts—which lacked juries—were 
also responsible for enforcing the trade laws against the colonists, rendering them 
extremely unpopular.”); see also David S. Lovejoy, Rights Imply Equality: The 
Case Against Admiralty Jurisdiction in America 1764–1776, 16 WM. & MARY Q. 
459, 461 (1959). Because of the previous animosity, the Continental Congress 
“studiously avoided” the name “Courts of Admiralty.” Jameson, supra note 28, at 
6. 
 55. For more, see Jameson, supra note 28, at 5 (“Where the governor had acted 
as judge, he was now in flight. The admiralty judges, as dependents of the 
governor, would most likely flee also; and the more so because their courts had of 
late years become highly unpopular, since a recent act had placed many 
infractions of the revenue laws under their jurisdiction, so that they were tried 
without a jury.”). 
 56. Letters from George Washington, supra note 36. 
 57. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 46. Note that some states disregarded 
congressional command to use juries in prize disputes. Delaware never allowed 
juries to decide Prize Cases, and Pennsylvania did not after 1780. Id. at 192. 
Maryland, North Carolina, and Massachusetts did not always use juries in Prize 
suits. Id. (explaining that “[t]hough not universally used, juries were definitely 
the rule and not the exception in prize litigation.”). 
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respect, by reserving appellate jurisdiction to itself in all 
Prize Cases.58 Congress sometimes acted legislatively, and 
sometimes played the role of an executive body. Now, 
Congress also took on a judicial role.59  
Washington’s response to Congress’s actions was 
lukewarm. Perhaps anticipating the difficulties that would 
later arise, he wrote back to Congress that “[t]he resolves 
relative to captures made by Continental armed vessels only 
want a court established for trial to make them complete.”60 
And, in fact, Congress’s plan to oversee Prize disputes by 
hearing appeals from the state courts did not go smoothly. 
Although the states generally applied the law according to 
the resolutions of Congress and the law of nations,61 they 
jealously guarded their jurisdiction over their cases. Each 
state believed it had the power to establish its own courts and 
to define their jurisdiction—including the scope of the right 
of appeal to Congress in Prize Cases.62 Consequently, nearly 
every state limited appeals to the Committee and, later, to 
the Court of Appeals. Massachusetts and New Hampshire, 
  
 58. See id. at 45-46.  
 59. Congress also took on a semi-judicial role deciding boundary disputes in 
“ad hoc” tribunals. Swindler, supra note 28, at 514. But the court was, as Jameson 
points out, “called into existence only a very few times (three apparently), and 
actually convened and pronounced judgment in one case”—a dispute between 
Pennsylvania and Connecticut over Wyoming. Jameson, supra note 28, at 3. 
Notably, James Wilson was the lawyer for Pennsylvania, which prevailed in the 
dispute. William Ewald, James Wilson and The Drafting of the Constitution, 10 
U. PA. J. CON. L. 901, 910 (2008). 
 60. Letters from George Washington, reprinted in 3 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON: BEING HIS CORRESPONDENCE, ADDRESSES, MESSAGES, AND OTHER 
PAPERS, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE 196-97 (Jared Sparks ed., 1837). 
 61. See 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS (Dec. 4, 1781), at 1158 
(Washington Chauncey Ford ed., rev. ed. 1904-1937) [hereinafter JOURNALS OF 
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS] (“The rules of decision in the several courts shall be 
the resolutions and ordinances of the United States in Congress assembled, public 
treaties when declared to be so by an act of Congress, and the law of nations, 
according to the general usages of Europe. Public treaties shall have the pre-
eminence in all trials.”). 
 62. Swindler, supra note 28, at 513-14 (“The language of state legislation often 
explicitly limited appeals to a higher court within the state jurisdiction or was 
sufficiently ambiguous to enable states to determine the legality of an appeal to 
the national court.”). 
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for example, only allowed appeals in disputes involving ships 
outfitted by Congress.63 Rhode Island and Connecticut 
allowed a broader appellate jurisdiction, but excluded several 
kinds of cases from appellate review by Congress.64 Georgia 
allowed appeals only after a second trial by a special jury.65 
Pennsylvania only permitted appeals on questions of law.66 
Only New Jersey, Delaware, and South Carolina allowed 
Congress its full appellate jurisdiction.67 Most states thus 
disregarded congressional authority in some way, despite the 
fact that the draft of the Articles of Confederation in July 
1776 gave Congress the exclusive power to decide Prize Case 
appeals.68  
On July 4, 1776, the first Prize appeal—regarding a ship 
named the Thistle—was presented to Congress.69 Naturally 
enough, Congress was engrossed in other tasks, and did not 
get to the appeal for several months.70 In the case of the 
Thistle, and the six appeals that followed it, members of 
Congress rotated through the Committee, with John Adams, 
James Wilson, Oliver Ellsworth, Edmund Randolph, and 
many others serving as appellate judges.71 The shifting 
membership of the Committee had at least one beneficial side 
  
 63. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 74. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 75. 
 67. Id.  
 68. GOEBEL, supra note 11, at 163 (“All of these assertions of state sovereignty 
fell just short of overt hostility to central management of common concerns. What 
lent these statutes a peculiarly aggressive quality was the fact that in the first 
draft of the Articles of Confederation (July 1776) Congress had been given power 
to establish rules of prize as well as courts to receive and finally determine 
appeals in all cases of captures.”). 
 69. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 81. This was not, however, the first case 
that had been presented to Congress. There was some confusion initially about 
the Court’s jurisdiction; the first two applications made to Congress were for 
exercise of “original jurisdiction,” which it declined. See Davis, supra note 28, at 
xxii. 
 70. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 81. 
 71. Id. at 329 n.22. 
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effect: it exposed dozens of members of Congress both to prize 
cases and to the judicial process more generally.72  
But a crack in the system appeared early on: 
inconsistency. Although Congress and the states were, in 
theory, following the “law of nations” and the English Prize 
system, there was little knowledge of Prize law in Congress, 
and little access to relevant books.73 And the inconsistency in 
the Committee’s membership led to inconsistency in the law; 
the law announced in one case was not necessarily followed 
in another. Nor was the membership of the Committee 
always clear, even in an individual case; in the case of the 
Phoenix, for example, Congress heard three appeals before 
the case was decided, in part because the case had initially 
been heard by the wrong members of Congress.74  
In January of 1777, based on the experience of eight 
appeals, Congress passed a series of resolutions that 
composed a “standing [C]ommittee” of five members to decide 
the cases, appointing ad hoc members during the inevitable 
absences.75 The Committee began functioning even more like 
an appellate court. 
Still, others campaigned for an even more permanent 
situation for the Committee. In 1779, a group of merchants 
in Philadelphia—which included James Wilson—wrote to 
Congress imploring it to revamp the appellate system. 
Noting that “[c]ertainty in the [l]aws is the great [s]ource of 
the people’s [s]ecurity,” the Philadelphians wrote that “[i]n a 
[c]ourt where there is this [c]onstant change and succession 
  
 72. Id. at 90-91 (noting that over the forty-two appeals heard when the 
Committee was active, “thirty-seven members of Congress were at one time or 
another appointed to sit on the Committee of Appeals.”). 
 73. Id. at 189 (explaining that without a more comprehensive book available 
on Prize law, “American lawyers and judges who took the trouble to read what 
was then available could only find a hazy picture of [P]rize procedures which must 
have closely resembled the [P]rize practice they could see in their own vice-
admiralty courts.”); see also GOEBEL, supra note 11, at 154 (indicating that 
“[t]here were no available admiralty reports, for the jurisprudence as practiced 
and applied in the High Court was a memory jurisprudence of the most arcane 
variety.”). 
 74. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 87. 
 75. See Davis, supra note 28, at xxiii. 
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of [j]udges, it is impossible that fixed principles can be 
established, or the doctrine of precedents ever take place.”76 
This uncertainty, the letter continued, created obstacles to 
justice that caused unreasonable delay particularly harsh on 
the privateers. “In the privateering trade in particular, the 
very life of which consists in the adventurers receiving the 
rewards of their Success and Bravery as soon as the Cruize 
is over, the least delay is uncommonly destructive.”77 
C. The First Federal Court 
Spurred in part by the Philadelphia merchants’ letter, 
and in part by the irritation and time demands of handling 
Prize appeals,78 Congress began paving the way for a 
permanent court, appointing committees to devise the 
framework for how the Court would work. Four years after 
Washington’s request, the Court of Appeals in Cases of 
Capture—the first federal court—was finally established.  
Congress selected three judges—George Wythe, William 
Paca, and Titus Hosmer79—and in 1780, all appeals were 
transferred from the Committee to the new Court.80 The 
Court operated much like the Committee, using similar 
procedures to admit and take evidence, and continuing to re-
examine facts after a jury verdict, including reviewing new 
depositions.81 And like the Committee on Appeals, the Court 
of Appeals depended on the states for the enforcement of its 
decisions.  
  
 76. Jameson, supra note 28, at 24-25. 
 77. Id. at 25-26. Further, the merchants complained that the Court only ever 
sat where Congress resided, so “parties who attend it are perhaps under the 
necessity of coming to Congress from the most distant parts of the United States” 
at great expense and time. Id. at 25. 
 78. Unquestionably, the Committee demanded a great deal of time from the 
otherwise busy Congressmen and became a headache. See infra notes 354-67 and 
accompanying text367 (discussing the Committee being delayed by the 
Pennsylvania legislature and the U.S. Supreme Court). 
 79. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 116. 
 80. Id. at 119. 
 81. GOEBEL, supra note 11, at 177. 
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Despite their short life span,82 the Committee on Appeals, 
and later, the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture, became 
the testing ground—a “graduate seminar”83—for the national 
judiciary. The Court decided nearly 120 cases, upholding 
state judgments in thirty-nine appeals, and reversing them 
in forty-nine, before its closure in 1787.84 An active break 
from English practice, the freestanding Court of Appeals was 
not only the first federal court, but also the predecessor of a 
single Supreme Court. The new Supreme Court’s docket 
included many cases that began life in the Court of Appeals 
in Cases of Capture; the Supreme Court was quick to affirm 
the Capture Court’s jurisdiction and demand enforcement of 
its decisions.85 But the experience would also play a less 
obvious role in shaping the national judiciary, and diversity 
jurisdiction in particular. 
  
 82. John C. Hogan, The Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture, 33 OREG. L. REV. 
95, 103–04 (1953). The end of the court was less dramatic than its beginnings. In 
1784, no new appeals were being filed, and two of the judges wrote to Congress 
explaining that the docket was cleared. Id. at 103. Congress then swiftly resolved 
that the Court would continue, but that the salaries of the judges should 
“henceforth cease.” Id. The judges were upset about losing their salaries. Id. 
Congress then explained that it was 
impressed with a sense of the ability, fidelity, and attention of the Judges 
of the Court of Appeals . . . but that, as the [W]ar was at an end, and the 
business of that court in a great measure done away, an attention to the 
interests of their constituents made it necessary that the salaries of the 
said judges should cease. 
Id. The Court did have further business with rehearings, and the judges 
continued to sit at an allowance of ten dollars a day, until the closing of the court 
in 1787. Id. J. Franklin Jameson pointed out that “Hamilton, it is interesting to 
find, during his brief term of service in Congress, made a characteristic attempt 
to prolong the life of this federal institution, feeling doubtless that any such 
institution was, for ‘continental’ reasons, too valuable to be allowed to expire.” 
Jameson, supra note 28, at 35. 
 83. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 319. 
 84. See id. at 217, 319. 
 85. See, e.g., United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115, 140 (U.S. 1809) (“By the 
highest judicial authority of the nation, it has been long since decided, that the 
court of appeals erected by congress had full authority to revise and correct the 
sentences of the courts of admiralty of the several states, in prize causes.”); 
Jennings v. Carson, 4 Cranch 2, 21-22 (U.S. 1807) (holding that the Continental 
Congress had authority to establish appellate tribunals over Prize Cases); 
Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dal. 54, 113 (U.S. 1795) (same).  
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II. BOLSTERING THE GEOGRAPHIC BIAS THEORY OF DIVERSITY 
JURISDICTION 
A. Traditional View of Diversity Jurisdiction 
As described above, the traditional view of diversity 
jurisdiction—that it arose from geographic bias against 
citizens from out-of-state—has largely been discarded by 
scholars of Article III’s origins. This Section rehabilitates the 
traditional view of diversity, and refutes Friendly’s challenge 
to it, through a close examination of geographic bias in the 
Prize Cases. 
Despite its current unpopularity, the traditional view 
has always had strong evidence on its side. Judging from the 
few contemporaneous statements the Framers actually made 
about diversity jurisdiction, their stated motive for its 
inclusion was clear: federal jurisdiction over disputes 
between citizens of different states, and between Americans 
and foreigners, was intended to mitigate bias against 
outsiders, particularly in matters of debt collection.  
Though it was unchallenged at the Continental 
Congress,86 diversity jurisdiction was controversial during 
the ratification debates. Madison argued in Virginia that 
diversity jurisdiction was necessary because  
[i]t may happen that a strong prejudice may arise, in some states 
against the citizens of others, who may have claims against them. 
We know what tardy, and even defective, administration of justice 
has happened in some states. A citizen of another state might not 
chance to get justice in a state court, and at all events might think 
himself injured.87 
  
 86. Friendly, supra note 3, at 486-87 (quoting 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, 168, 169-70 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter 
Farrand, Records]) (“Mr. Baldwin of Georgia told Ezra Stiles in December that 
the delegates had been ‘unanimous also in the Expedy & Necessy of a supreme 
judicial Tribunal of universal Jurisdiction—in Controversies of a legal Nature 
between States—Revenue—& appellate Causes between subjects of foreign or 
different states.’”). 
 87. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1901) [hereinafter 
Elliot’s Debates].  
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Hamilton echoed these concerns in The Federalist 
Papers. The principle that “[n]o man ought certainly to be a 
judge in his own cause, or in any cause in respect to which he 
has the least interest or bias[,]” weighed heavily “in 
designating the federal courts as proper tribunals for the 
determination of controversies between different states and 
their citizens.”88 Therefore, these cases must “be committed 
to that tribunal, which, having no local attachments, will be 
likely to be impartial between the different states and their 
citizens, and which, owing its official existence to the union, 
will never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the 
principles on which it is founded.”89  
Even more striking are the statements of James Wilson 
and Oliver Ellsworth, the two Framers with perhaps the 
most influence on the national judiciary. James Wilson, one 
of the most active Framers in arguing and deciding Prize 
Cases, was, as Friendly noted, “the most enthusiastic 
defender of [the Diversity] [C]lause of the new 
Constitution.”90 Wilson asked “[h]ow a merchant must feel to 
have his property lay at the mercy of the laws of Rhode 
Island? I ask further, how will a creditor feel who has his 
debts at the mercy of tender laws in other states?”91 
Similarly, Oliver Ellsworth, who drafted the Judiciary Act,92 
is reported to have said that “our Juries” were “generally 
prejudiced” against “foreigners” and that  
[t]he Laws of nations & Treaties were too much disregarded in the 
several States—Juries were too apt to be biased against them, in 
favor of their own citizens & acquaintances; it was therefore 
  
 88. Hamilton went further than diversity with this justification, adding “[a]nd 
it ought to have the same operation in regard to some cases between citizens of 
the same State.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 498 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry 
Cabot Lodge ed., 1889). 
 89. Id. at 497. 
 90. Friendly, supra note 3, at 486. 
 91. 2 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87, 491-92. 
 92. The first draft of the act is in Ellsworth’s hand. Charles Warren, New Light 
on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 50 (1923). 
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necessary to have general Courts for causes in which foreigners 
were parties or citizens of different States[.]93  
From these statements of the Framers, the traditional 
view, as articulated by Charles Warren, is that “[t]he chief 
and only real reason” for diversity was “to afford a tribunal 
in which a foreigner or citizen of another State might have 
the law administered free from the local prejudices or 
passions which might prevail in a State Court against 
foreigners or non-citizens.”94 Warren added, for emphasis: 
“[t]here is not a trace of any other purpose than the above to 
be found in any of the arguments made in 1787-1789 as to 
this jurisdiction.”95 Robert Brown agreed, writing in 1929 
that  
[t]here seems to be no disagreement as to the primary purpose of 
this provision for federal jurisdiction based upon diversity of 
citizenship. It was to provide, so far as possible, against injury to 
nonresident suitors because of local and sectional prejudice, which 
would be extremely unlikely to have an important effect in state 
courts.96  
 Courts, too, have largely adopted the idea that 
geographic bias, or at least, avoiding the appearance of bias,97 
motivated diversity jurisdiction.  
  
 93. Commentary from William Loughton Smith to Edward Rutledge (Aug. 9-
10, 1789), reprinted in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800: ORGANIZING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: LEGISLATION 
AND COMMENTARIES 496, 497-99 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992). 
 94. Warren, supra note 92, at 83. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Robert C. Brown, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Based on Diversity 
of Citizenship, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 181 (1929).  
 97. See, e.g., Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331, 354 (1855) (“The foundation of the 
right of citizens of different States to sue each other in the courts of the United 
States, is not an unworthy jealousy of the impartiality of the state tribunals. It 
has a higher aim and purpose. It is to make the people think and feel, though 
residing in different States of the Union, that their relations to each other were 
protected by the strictest justice, administered in courts independent of all local 
control or connection with the subject-matter of the controversy between the 
parties to a suit.”); Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809) 
(“However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer 
justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it is 
not less true that the constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this 
2015] THE PRIZE CASES 499 
B. Friendly’s Rejection of the Traditional View 
But in 1928, Henry Friendly upset this standard view.98 
In The Historical Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, Friendly 
proposed an alternative theory for the source of the Diversity 
Clause.99 First, Friendly dismissed the Framers’ statements 
about state prejudice, calling their defense of diversity 
jurisdiction “apath[etic].”100 As an example, Friendly pointed 
to Madison’s less than rousing defense at the state 
ratification debates: “As to its cognizance of disputes between 
citizens of different states, I will not say it is a matter of much 
importance. Perhaps it might be left to the state courts.”101  
And although Madison also said that “[i]t may happen 
that a strong prejudice may arise, in some states, against the 
citizens of others, who may have claims against them[,]”102 
Friendly did not take that claim seriously. “Madison does not 
point out any specific examples of prejudice, does not allege 
that any exist; Madison even gives the innuendo that none 
do exist.”103 And, Friendly added, “if there had been no 
injustice under the chaos and state jealousy of the 
Confederation, why was there cause for apprehension as to 
  
subject, . . . that it has established national tribunals for the decision of 
controversies between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different 
states.”). 
 98. Friendly was only eight months out of law school at the time. Louis H. 
Pollak, In Praise of Friendly, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 39, 40 (1984) (quoting Henry J. 
Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 483 
(1928) (noting that “[t]he paper must have been conceived when the author was 
still in student status, for he was at pains to acknowledge his substantial 
indebtedness ‘to Professor Felix Frankfurter . . . both for suggesting the subject 
of this paper and for constant help in its preparation.’”)). 
 99. This view might perhaps be better called the Frankfurter-Friendly view, 
given Frankfurter’s input into the article. See id. 
 100. Friendly, supra note 3, at 486. 
 101. Id. at 487 (quoting 3 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87, at 533). Friendly does, 
however, leave out the next section of Madison’s quote, in which he adds “[b]ut I 
sincerely believe this provision will be rather salutary than otherwise.” 3 Elliot’s 
Debates, supra note 87, at 533. 
 102.  Friendly, supra note 3, at 492 (quoting 3 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87, 
at 533).  
 103. Id. at 493.  
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prejudice under the new regime of the Constitution?”104 
Similarly, Friendly explained that “[e]ven the statesman who 
was to be most closely identified with the creation of a 
powerful federal judiciary”—future Chief Justice John 
Marshall—“admitted in regard to diversity jurisdiction: 
‘[w]ere I to contend, that this was necessary in all cases, and 
that the government without it would be defective, I should 
not use my own judgment.’”105  
Instead of relying on the Framers’ statements, Friendly 
searched for actual evidence of bias in the state courts before 
the drafting of the Constitution, and found the record of 
prejudice lacking.106 He reviewed the results of litigation 
between diverse parties in state law reports.107 Although he 
acknowledged that the state reports only gave a “fraction” of 
the cases, “such information as we are able to gather from 
the reporters entirely fails to show the existence of prejudice 
on the part of the state judges.”108 In the nine diversity of 
citizenship cases he found in Connecticut, for example, he 
concluded that “the record of the court is highly creditable. 
In only two of them was the domestic party victorious, and 
these cases could not well have gone the other way.”109 
Friendly found little evidence of state bias in other state 
reports, and “none have been found which indicate undue 
prejudice on the part of the local tribunal.”110 From this 
evidence, Friendly concluded, “there was little cause to fear 
that the state tribunals would be hostile to litigants from 
other states.”111  
But what motivated diversity, if not fear of interstate 
prejudice? Friendly’s answer was straightforward: “the 
desire to protect creditors against legislation favorable to 
debtors was a principal reason for the grant of diversity 
  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 487-88 (quoting 3 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87, at 556). 
 106. Id. at 493. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id.  
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 494. 
 111. Id. at 497. 
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jurisdiction . . . .”112 State courts and state legislatures could 
not be trusted with commercial litigation.113 Friendly 
explained how in New Hampshire, for example, “the 
legislature was equally occupied with tasks that are 
commonly thought to be exclusively the business of the 
courts.”114 For example, the New Hampshire legislature 
vacated judgments and annulled deeds, and even allowed 
“certain litigants to secure review of judgments, though the 
time for taking such action had passed.”115 “Not unnaturally,” 
Friendly wrote, “the commercial interests of the country were 
reluctant to expose themselves to the hazards of litigation 
before such courts as these.”116 Friendly could not, however, 
pin down exactly why the Framers thought federal courts 
would provide a better forum for commercial cases than state 
courts.117 Although he briefly discussed the superior method 
of appointment, the tenure of judges, and the “practical 
workings of the system,”118 ultimately he believed the 
Framers had no more than “a vague feeling that the new 
courts would be strong courts, creditors’ courts, business 
men’s courts.”119  
Modern scholars have been quick to adopt Friendly’s 
view that geographic bias against citizens from different 
states was not the true source of diversity jurisdiction. Felix 
Frankfurter—Henry Friendly’s mentor—agreed that “[s]uch 
distrust as there was of local courts derived, not from any fear 
of their partiality to resident litigants, but of their general 
inadequacy for the interests of the business community.”120 
John P. Frank echoed that diversity stemmed from a belief 
that “the federal courts would be more sympathetic to 
  
 112. Id. at 496-97. 
 113. Id. at 498. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 497. 
 119. Id. at 498. 
 120. Frankfurter, supra note 9, at 520.  
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business interests than the state courts.”121 More recently, 
Patrick J. Borchers has argued that instead of geographic 
bias, “diversity was intended at least in part as a protection 
against aberrational state laws, particularly those regarding 
commercial transactions.”122 And invoking in part Friendly’s 
argument, Judge Posner has agreed that “[b]ias played a 
smaller role in the creation of the diversity jurisdiction than 
is generally believed . . . .”123  
In short, as Debra Lyn Bassett concluded, “today’s major 
argument for retaining diversity jurisdiction—the protection 
of out-of-state litigants from local bias—is not supported by 
the original constitutional documents. There is no reason to 
believe that local bias was a reason, much less the reason, 
behind the creation of diversity jurisdiction.”124 
Compelling arguments. Thus, despite the stated intent of 
the Framers, Friendly’s dismissal of geographic bias as the 
central concern of the Framers in favor of a more economic 
rationale is now considered “authoritative.”125  
C. Friendly’s View Reconsidered in Light of the Prize Cases 
Friendly’s dismissal of the geographic bias theory is 
arguably problematic even on its own terms. Hessel E. 
Yntema and George H. Jaffin, for example, have provided 
ample reason to doubt Friendly’s claims that the Framers 
cared little about diversity jurisdiction.126 The idea that 
  
 121. Frank, Historical Bases, supra note 12, at 27. 
 122. Borchers, supra note 31, at 81.  
 123. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 212 
(1999). 
 124. Debra Lyn Bassett, The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 119, 130 (2003). 
 125. Pollak, supra note 98, at 41 (“Friendly’s article was and remains the 
authoritative study of the genesis and early days of diversity jurisdiction.”); see 
also Borchers, supra note 31, at 81 (“[D]iversity was intended at least in part as 
a protection against aberrational state laws, particularly those regarding 
commercial transactions.”); Frank, Historical Bases, supra note 12, at 27 (echoing 
that diversity stemming from “the federal courts would be more sympathetic to 
business interests than the state courts.”); Frankfurter, supra note 9, at 250. 
 126. See generally Hessel E. Yntema & George H. Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis 
of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 869 (1931). 
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“staunch federalists, such as Madison and Marshall, gave 
‘tepid’ support to the federal diverse-citizenship jurisdiction, 
probably should be taken cum grano salis . . . .”127 If the 
Framers’ statements in defense of diversity jurisdiction 
sometimes seem tepid, Yntema and Jaffin argued that it was 
only because the Constitution’s supporters had to be 
circumspect in the face of substantial opposition.128 “The 
attitude of the federalists during the controversy succeeding 
the Constitutional Convention was necessarily conciliatory, 
as they desired primarily to assure the ratification of the 
Constitution.”129 Yntema and Jaffin also rejected Friendly’s 
claim that state bias did not exist in the state courts, pointing 
out there was “[n]o contemporary denial of the existence of 
local prejudice” and that the records of the time were “full 
enough of evidence of local feelings.”130  
But these critiques of Friendly are, perhaps, beside the 
point; when considering the Framers’ motives, whether bias 
actually existed in interstate litigation does not matter as 
much as whether the Framers believed that bias existed. 
Friendly’s claim hinges on the argument that actual bias 
“had only a speculative existence in 1789”131 and that “the 
provision with which we are to be concerned in this study was 
not a product of difficulties that had been acutely felt under 
the Confederation.”132 We do not know whether the Framers 
  
 127. Id. at 875 n.12. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. at 876-77 n.13. Wythe Holt has offered a similar critique:  
[I]t would not be accurate to conclude from such a sparse record, as 
Friendly concluded about diversity jurisdiction, that federal courts were 
“not a product of difficulties that had been acutely felt under the 
Confederation” or that “fears of local hostilities . . . had only a speculative 
existence in 1789 . . . .” [D]ebtors suffered “acutely” during the 
Confederation period, thereby creating “difficulties” for creditors that the 
Constitution was designed to solve. 
Holt, The Invention of Federal Courts, supra note 24, at 1425 (quoting Friendly, 
supra note 3, at 484, 510). Unlike Friendly, Holt found in his own search of records 
evidence of bias in the state courts. See id. at 1455-56.  
 131. Friendly, supra note 3, at 510. 
 132. Id. at 484. 
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were actually aware of interstate bias in the state courts in 
commercial cases. We do know, however, what the Framers 
saw firsthand adjudicating disputes between diverse parties 
in the Prize Cases. Taking this experience into account 
upsets Friendly’s claim that the Framers’ stated 
justifications for diversity were somehow insincere. 
The Prize Cases, which frequently involved disputes 
between interstate or international claimants, were riddled 
with the very local bias that Friendly denied existed in the 
colonial courts. After reviewing the Prize Case records 
closely, Henry Bourguignon, who wrote the definitive history 
of the Prize Cases, concluded that in most cases state courts 
generally decided Prize disputes in favor of privateers from 
their state, “even in the face of direct evidence of neutrality 
or American ownership of a prize.”133 “Out-of-state or foreign 
litigants could be denied justice by state admiralty courts,” 
he explained, “and their pleas to Congress called forth 
reassuring promises that justice would be done, but little 
effective relief.”134  
And, although the records do not always reveal whether 
a court’s decision was only the product of geographic bias, 
several cases show its obvious influence. A Massachusetts 
jury, for example, awarded the entirety of a Prize to a 
Massachusetts privateer, “despite the latter’s clear 
agreement with a Rhode Island privateer to share all prizes, 
and the decree was affirmed by the Massachusetts superior 
court.”135 In Connecticut, privateers regularly targeted ships 
belonging to New York citizens, even though there was no 
proof of British ownership, and the Connecticut courts 
regularly upheld those seizures.136  
  
 133. Gerard W. Gawalt, Henry J. Bourguignon, The First Federal Court. The 
Federal Appellate Prize Court of the American Revolution 1775-1787, 22 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 271, 272 (1978) (reviewing BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Holt, The Invention of the Federal Courts, supra note 24, at 1429. 
 136. Id. In another example, a New Jersey court awarded the Mermaid, a 
British transport ship, to a New Jersey boat crew and owner, rather than to out-
of-state privateers; it is unclear whether it was because the Mermaid reached the 
prize first, or because “the boat crew were local residents, while the privateers 
were from other states.” BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 271. 
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Bias was also a factor in one of the most famous Cases of 
the era, the case of the Lusanna.137 In short,138 the Lusanna 
was sailing from Boston to London and back—its cargo full of 
hundreds of casks of valuable spermaceti oil and “head 
matter”139—when it was forced by a storm to stop in 
Canada.140 Having taken a British registry to leave Canada, 
Shearjashub Bourne, the son-in-law of the ship’s owner, 
posed as a loyalist once the ship reached London to make the 
ship’s departure back to Canada easier.141 Once in Canada, 
he and the crew would be able to throw off their loyalist 
“cover” and return to Boston. Unfortunately, a New 
Hampshire privateer ship, the McClary, captured the 
Lusanna before it made it back to Canada, and libeled it in a 
New Hampshire court. This put Bourne, and his father-in-
law, Elisha Doane, in the difficult position of explaining that 
the ship had only been posing as loyalist.142 
Doane and Bourne, both Massachusetts-based, hired 
John Adams to represent them in New Hampshire.143 But 
things did not look to be in Doane’s favor. The day before the 
  
 137. See Penhallow v. Doane’s Adm'rs, 3 U.S. 54 (1795). 
 138. The facts of many of the Prize Cases are byzantine, and even more so in 
the case of the Lusanna. The details of the Lusanna are laid out in all of their 
complex glory here. See Editorial Note, The Adams Papers Digital Editions, MASS. 
HISTORICAL SOC’Y 357-62 [hereinafter Editorial Note], available at 
http://www.masshist.org/publications/apde/portia.php?id=LJA02d082#LJA02d0
82n77.  
 139. “Head-matter” was the “waxy head-matter encased in the skull of the 
Sperm” whale, used for making candles. Dauril Auden, Yankee Sperm Whalers in 
Brazilian Waters, and the Decline of the Portuguese Whale Fishery (1773-1801), 
20 THE AMERICAS 267, 275 (1964).  
 140. See Editorial Note, supra note 138, at 358.  
 141. Id. at 358-59. 
 142. See id. at 362-65. Posing as a loyalist was a common way of doing business 
during the Revolutionary War. See BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 242 
(explaining that “[b]ecause of the difficulties of commerce immediately before and 
during the [W]ar, an American merchant often found his property liable to 
capture by both the British and the Americans. The merchant resorted to many 
ruses such as double papers to protect their property and therefore, when 
discovered engaging in suspicious activities, at times were forced to give 
complicated and implausible explanations of their conduct.”). 
 143. See Editorial Note, supra note 138, at 362-63. 
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trial, Adams wrote to his wife, Abigail, that the case of the 
Lusanna  
[C]omes on Tomorrow, before my old Friend Dr. Joshua Brackett, 
as Judge of Admiralty. How it will go I know not. The Captors are 
a numerous Company, and are said to be very tenacious, and have 
many Connections; so that We have Prejudice, and Influence to 
fear: Justice, Policy and Law, are, I am very sure, on our Side.144 
 Despite “Justice, Policy and Law,” Doane lost the case 
in the New Hampshire court.145 On appeal to the New 
Hampshire Superior Court, he lost again.146 New Hampshire 
did not then allow appeals to Congress unless the ship had 
been outfitted by the “United Colonies.”147 
But Doane petitioned Congress to hear his case 
anyway.148 The Committee on Appeals ruled that it had 
jurisdiction, and the case was soon transferred to the new 
Court of Appeals.149 There, with James Wilson as his 
lawyer,150 Doane complained that the jury was biased against 
him in favor of privateers from their home states.151 Even if 
the Court of Appeals ruled in his favor, he believed that the 
New Hampshire courts would not heed the Court’s 
decision.152 And indeed, when the new Court of Appeals 
reversed the New Hampshire decision, the New Hampshire 
court refused to enforce the Court of Appeals’ decision, 
  
 144. Id. at 364. Just because Judge Brackett was a “friend” of Adams, didn’t 
mean he was unbiased. As C. James Taylor points out, “Brackett may have been 
JA’s old friend, but he was undoubtedly a current acquaintance of at least 10 of 
the McClary owners, who, with him, were members of [minister] Ezra Stiles’ 
congregation.” Id. at n.52. 
 145. Id. at 365-68. Interestingly, the Lusanna marked the end of John Adams’s 
legal career; according to his autobiography, he was in court for the case when he 
learned that he had been appointed to go to France. See id. at 368. 
 146. GOEBEL, supra note 11, at 179. 
 147. Id. 
 148. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 244. 
 149. Id. at 179-80. 
 150. Id. at 251 (describing Wilson’s arguments on appeal). 
 151. See Editorial Note, supra note 138, at 369. 
 152. Id. at 372-73.  
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arguing again that the Court lacked jurisdiction.153 Only after 
the passing of the Judiciary Act—eighteen years after the 
initial trial—was the decision enforced in New Hampshire, 
at the instance of the U.S. Supreme Court.154 
In another case, both Ellsworth and Wilson defended a 
client from an obvious case of geographic bias. The Hope, full 
of “[h]ogshead and tierces of rum, sugar and limes, a ‘kegg of 
tamarines,’ barrels of yams, India chintz, ‘black sattin’ and 
women’s gloves,”155 was seized by Connecticut privateers. 
The ship’s owner, Aaron Lopez, a Jewish merchant156 from 
Massachusetts, had a business transporting goods from 
Jamaica.157 Though Lopez claimed he was “and ever ha[d] 
been a true and faithful Subject of the United States of 
America,”158 the privateers claimed the Hope was an enemy 
ship.159 At the trial in Hartford, the judge refused to accept 
two jury verdicts, which, though unreported, were 
presumably in Lopez’s favor.160 He sent the jury back to 
deliberate a third time, after which they could not agree. The 
judge then impaneled a second jury, which, as one account of 
the case concluded, “promptly . . . reported a verdict in favor 
of the local boys . . . .”161 The judge accepted this verdict.162 
“[O]pen and base partiality I discovered in some of the 
  
 153. Id. at 372-73. 
 154. Id. at 373-75. Doane had died by this time. Id. at 372.  
 155. Lee M. Friedman, Aaron Lopez’ Long Deferred “Hope,” 37 PUBL’NS. AM. 
JEWISH HIST. SOC’Y, 103, 108 (1947). With such wealth taken from the ship, it is 
no surprise that he wrote to Ellsworth, asking his advice on securing a court date 
and when, as “[he] propose[d] to attend it in person.” Id. at 103. 
 156. Lopez was also a notorious slave trader. See Virginia Bever Platt, “And 
Don’t Forget the Guinea Voyage”: The Slave Trade of Aaron Lopez of Newport, 32 
WM. & MARY. Q. 601, 602 (1975). 
 157. Friedman, supra note 155, at 103-04. 
 158. Id. at 105. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See id. at 110.  
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
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Hon’ble bench[,]” Lopez wrote in a letter to a friend and 
rabbi.163  
Ellsworth had represented Lopez in the state courts,164 
and Wilson and William Lewis were his counsel on appeal.165 
The Committee on Appeals reversed the decision, restoring 
the ship and its contents to Lopez.166 Yet, like Doane, Lopez 
struggled to have the Committee’s decision enforced. He filed 
a suit against the marshal in the Connecticut court, which 
was dismissed, and then appealed to the Hartford Superior 
Court.167 Finally, the Connecticut courts issued an order 
giving effect to the Committee’s decision in 1782, though it 
was not actually enforced until September of 1783.168  
This evidence of bias in the Prize Cases is unsurprising 
considering that prejudice against those from other states 
was rampant during the Revolutionary period. Unneighborly 
disputes over trade led to interstate jealousies as states 
imposed high protective tariffs on their goods.169 Frustrations 
over the imbalance of war debt added to the grievances, as 
did the bitter disputes with regard to paper money, the value 
of which was always fluctuating. The Georgia legislature, for 
example, refused to accept any currency other than its own 
for confiscated property, a decision that a correspondent of 
Governor Caswell said was done “to humble the pride of the 
  
 163. Id. at 103. Of course, it is difficult to untangle the bias Lopez experienced 
as an out-of-stater from the anti-Semitic bias he also likely suffered. But the 
record does not differentiate between the two biases; likely, it was a combination 
of both, though neither bias seemed to influence the jury the first two times they 
deliberated. 
 164. See id. 
 165. Id. at 110.  
 166. Id. at 111. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 113. Indeed, bias against non-local parties did not just come from 
juries; it often came in a delay or outright refusal to enforce decisions. For more, 
see the discussion of Olmstead, infra Part III.C. 
 169. See ALLAN NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE 
REVOLUTION 555-68 (1969).  
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North Carolinians, who refuse to take [Georgia’s] money, but 
at an under rate.”170  
Unsurprisingly, then, Washington then found his 
soldiers prejudiced against each other. North Carolinians 
were accused of being lazy, and the New Englanders 
complained of being called “damned Yankees.”171 
(Washington wasn’t immune to these prejudices, writing 
that he found the New Englanders he was camped with 
“exceedingly dirty and nasty people.”172) John Adams 
complained that rumors circulated of New Englanders 
“running away perpetually, and the Southern troops as 
standing bravely.”173 As historian Allan Nevins reports, a 
Brigadier-General in the Continental Army wrote that “‘the 
Pennsylvania and New England troops would as soon fight 
each other’ as the British,” a claim Nevins concludes was “no 
great exaggeration.”174  
In this context, many of the Framers, reviewing case 
after case in which prejudice was alleged, must have 
appreciated that state courts could be geographically biased, 
or at least that litigants claimed them to be.175 The nature of 
the Prize Cases perhaps even exaggerated these biases, 
inflating the levels of interstate prejudice in the eyes of the 
  
 170. Id. at 570. 
 171. Id. at 548. 
 172. Id. at 549. Adams complained that Washington “often mention[ed] things 
to the disadvantage of some part of New England” and that all of his aides came 
from the South, and showed no respect for New England. Id. at 551. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. Interestingly, Nevins reports, the troops helped changed Washington’s 
mind. In 1777, in a speech to the troops, Washington said, 
[w]ho, that was not a witness, . . . could imagine, that the most violent 
local prejudices would cease so soon; and that men, who came from 
different parts of the continent, strongly disposed by the habits of 
education to despise and quarrel with one another, would instantly 
become but one patriotic band of brothers?  
Id. at 554. 
 175. See Holt, Invention of Federal Courts, supra note 24, at 1429 (discussing, 
in the context of admiralty, how examples of bias, such as the ones in the Lopez 
case, “demonstrate why local bias against nonlocal citizens, both American and 
foreign, was obvious to many in the prize litigation emanating from the 
Revolution.”). 
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Framers; privateering carried risk and enormous reward for 
both the privateer and the colony that had outfitted it,176 
heightening the incentives for a jury to lean in favor of a local 
figure. It was not always clear who was the enemy—a 
loyalist—and who was a faithful American. Further, the law 
of nations was so little understood, even by the judges of the 
state courts,177 that jurors likely struggled with the standards 
they were asked to apply, making it easier to fall back on local 
prejudices.178 In this way, the nature of privateering disputes 
aggravated local feelings against outsiders that might have 
been present anyway. Diversity begins to seem “a product of 
difficulties that had been acutely felt under the 
Confederation.”179  
By stressing that the Framers had good reason to fear 
geographic bias in the state courts, we do not mean to argue 
that the grant of diversity jurisdiction was not also inspired 
by “economic, social, and political”180 divides in the new 
nation. Critics of the traditional view have succeeded in 
showing that the Framers were motivated in part by a desire 
to create courts favorable to commercial concerns. But in 
many instances, it is difficult to disentangle different kinds 
of bias; prejudice against outsiders often overlaps with 
prejudice against commercial parties. Geographic bias 
systematically favors one set of interests: preferring a 
neighbor to a stranger meant keeping money in the 
community. And in cases where an out-of-state merchant was 
accused of being British—such as Elisha Doane’s Lusanna or 
  
 176. Privateering carried great rewards for lawyers as well. John Adams wrote 
in his diary in 1777 that “[y]oung [g]entlemen who had been [c]lerks in my [o]ffice 
and others whom I had left in that [c]haracter in other [o]ffices were growing rich, 
for the Prize Causes, and other [c]ontroversies had made the profession of a 
[b]arrister more lucrative than it ever had been before.” 4 DIARY AND 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 1 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1961). 
 177. See BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 71, 95. 
 178. See Matthew P. Harrington, The Economic Origins of the Seventh 
Amendment, 87 IOWA L. REV. 145, 177 (2001) [hereinafter Harrington, Economic 
Origins] (“[S]tate court juries, lacking the expertise in the law of prize held by the 
vice-admiralty judges, often ignored well-established principles of the laws of 
nations and adjudged ships taken by local captains and crews to be lawful prize.”). 
 179. Friendly, supra note 3, at 484. 
 180. See Jones, supra note 22, at 1008. 
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Aaron Lopez’s Hope—local bias may well have been 
intensified by a bias against, or at least a misunderstanding 
of, commercial dealings.  
The Framers likely saw the federal courts as a way to 
mitigate both the geographic and commercial biases in the 
state courts. The Committee on Appeals and later the Court 
of Appeals were, in some respects, commercial courts that 
dealt kindly with merchants—almost always returning 
property to American merchants whom state courts had 
claimed to be British.181 As Bourguignon has put it, “the 
judges showed an appreciation of the difficulties in which 
American merchants had found themselves during the [W]ar. 
The judges tended to accept the arguments of the interested 
parties to explain away the incriminating evidence present 
at the time of the capture of their property.”182 The judges on 
the Court of Appeals were already setting a precedent for a 
court system that was sensitive to the problems faced by 
merchants—domestic and foreign.183 This attention to the 
needs of merchants, however, does not suggest that 
geographic bias was not also an independent motivation for 
diversity jurisdiction, particularly when so many of the 
merchants were themselves out-of-staters. 
III. HOW FEDERAL COURTS MITIGATE GEOGRAPHIC BIAS 
Identifying geographic bias as a source of diversity 
jurisdiction raises the question: how could a national 
judiciary fix problems of geographic bias in diversity suits? 
Again, the Prize Case experience offers a fresh perspective on 
this question. First, the Prize Cases directly inspired the 
Framers’ initial decision to vest the Supreme Court with 
jurisdiction over “Law and Fact,”184 giving the Court the 
ability to overrule biased jury decisions. Second, the Framers 
learned that resting diversity jurisdiction in inferior courts 
could help mitigate bias in decision-making. Finally, the 
Prize Case experience taught that the state courts and 
marshals could not always be trusted to enforce federal 
  
 181. See BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 251. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id.  
 184. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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decisions in cases where geographic bias was a factor. 
Without real enforcement powers of the kind provided by the 
Judiciary Act, federal appellate power would be toothless.  
A.  Appellate Jurisdiction as to Both “Law and Fact” 
The first lesson the Prize Case experience taught the 
Framers is that, at the very least, they would need to create 
a federal appellate court that could overrule biased jury 
decisions in diversity litigation. Article III of the Constitution 
provides that the Supreme Court shall have original 
jurisdiction over cases “affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be 
Party.”185 In all other cases, however, the Constitution 
provides that “the [S]upreme Court shall have appellate 
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, 
and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”186 
James Wilson explained the breadth of the clause at the 
Convention, explaining that it meant that the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction extended to “fact as well as law—and to 
cases of Common law as well as Civil Law.”187 No comments 
about this phrase were made after this statement, and the 
provision passed with ease.188 Thus, although Congress could 
curtail the Supreme Court’s power to review issues of fact, 
the drafters of Article III provided for a default rule that 
would allow the Court to overrule a state court jury’s 
decision.189  
  
 185. Id.  
 186. Id. (emphasis added). 
 187. 2 Farrand, Records, supra note 86, at 431. 
 188. See Ralph A. Rossum, Congress, the Constitution, and the Appellate 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and the Spirit of the Exceptions 
Clause, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385, 393 (1983). 
 189. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 552 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961) (explaining that “the Supreme Court shall possess appellate 
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, and that jurisdiction shall be subject to such 
exceptions and regulations as the national legislature may prescribe.”) (emphasis 
omitted); see also 3 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87, at 572 (statement of Edmund 
Randolph) (noting that Congress “may except generally both as to law and fact, 
or they may except as to the law only, or fact only.”). 
2015] THE PRIZE CASES 513 
A Supreme Court with the power to overturn jury 
decisions, though surprising today, would have been familiar 
to Framers with close connections to the Prize Cases. The 
Committee on Appeals and the Court of Appeals regularly 
decided factual issues.190 Unrestricted by the record below, 
the Committee and the Court reviewed factual issues in 
contested cases de novo, allowing new depositions to be taken 
and commissioning state officers to take depositions from 
those too distant to travel to Philadelphia.191 Congress 
repeatedly affirmed both the Committee’s and the Court’s 
ability to examine “decisions on facts as decisions on the 
law.”192 Although the Framers envisioned that Congress 
would curb the Supreme Court’s review in many civil cases,193 
the Prize Case experience perhaps explains why the Framers 
did not balk at this broad grant of jurisdiction that was so 
divisive in the state conventions. 
Indeed, the Framers explicitly invoked the Prize Case 
practices when justifying their grant of appellate jurisdiction 
over factual matters to the Supreme Court. At the 
Constitutional Convention, Wilson argued that “[t]he 
jurisdiction as to fact may be thought improper; but those 
possessed of information on this head see that it is 
necessary.”194 Wilson continued:  
Those gentlemen who during the late war had their vessels retaken, 
know well what a poor chance they would have had, when those 
vessels were taken into other states and tried by juries, and in what 
a situation they would have been, if the court of appeals had not 
  
 190. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 211-12. 
 191. Id.; see also GOEBEL, supra note 11, at 159-60. 
 192. 13 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 281, 283 
(Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1909).  
 193. See, e.g., Letter from John Adams to Thomas Brand-Hollis, FOUNDERS 
ONLINE (Jan. 4, 1788), available at http://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Adams/99-02-02-0305 (writing that “[o]ur new constitution does not expressly say 
that juries shall not extend to civil causes.—Nor, I presume, is it intended, to take 
away the trial by jury in any case, in which you, sir, yourself would wish to 
preserve it.”).  
 194. Remarks of James Wilson at the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 7, 1787), 
in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 520 
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976). 
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been possessed of authority to reconsider and set aside the verdict 
of those juries.195  
Hamilton also invoked the Prize Cases to support the 
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over factual 
questions, explaining in The Federalist Papers that “the re-
examination of the fact is agreeable to usage, and in some 
cases, of which prize causes are an example, might be 
essential to the preservation of the public peace.”196 
Ultimately, the Constitution’s critics successfully argued 
that the provision would allow judges to usurp the power of 
the jury trial; the Seventh Amendment conceded the point, 
limiting the Supreme Court’s power to review juries’ factual 
determinations in “Suits at common law.”197 Nevertheless, 
inspired by the Prize Cases, the Framers envisioned that the 
Supreme Court could have some power to neutralize jury 
biases, even in the absence of inferior federal courts. 
B. Replacing State Court Decisionmakers 
But appellate jurisdiction alone would only go so far; by 
providing the option for federal inferior courts in the 
Constitution,198 the Framers recognized that controlling the 
decision-making at the trial level would be an even more 
effective means of mitigating bias. Without lower courts, 
Madison had argued, “appeals would be multiplied to a most 
oppressive degree; that, besides, an appeal would not in 
  
 195. Id. at 514, 520-21.  
 196. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 189, at 551. 
 197. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.; Harrington, Economic Origins, supra note 178, 
at 147-48 (explaining that the “Seventh Amendment was really the climax of the 
long struggle over the right of the jury to find both law and fact in civil cases, and 
was designed to achieve a compromise between those who believed that the jury 
should have unfettered power to decide law and fact and those who sought to 
allow judges to impose some limits on the jury’s power to decide the whole of a 
case.”).  
 198. The Randolph proposal had provided for lower courts, but some delegates, 
believing that the state courts would better function as lower courts, brought a 
motion to eliminate federal inferior courts. The motion passed. Madison and 
Wilson then moved to provide the new Congress with the option of establishing 
lower courts, which was “enough to double the vote for lower courts.” See Frank, 
Historical Bases, supra note 12, at 10. 
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many cases be a remedy.”199 “What was to be done after 
improper verdicts, in state tribunals, obtained under the 
biased directions of a dependent judge, or the local prejudices 
of an undirected jury?” he asked.200 “To remand the cause for 
a new trial would answer no purpose. To order a new trial at 
the supreme bar would oblige the parties to bring up their 
witnesses, though ever so distant from the seat of the 
court.”201 Inferior courts could resolve these issues of bias at 
the local level.  
Admittedly, late eighteenth-century juries exercised far 
more power than juries do today; they even decided questions 
of law. Given that federal jurors would still hail from a 
particular locality, how would decision-makers in the inferior 
courts differ from their state counterparts? One answer is 
that federal judges would facilitate a different selection of 
eligible jurors. According to Robert Jones, “the key to 
understanding the origins of diversity jurisdiction is to 
recognize the dramatic ways in which federal juries were 
intended to differ from their state counterparts.”202 Most 
states “provided local sheriffs with virtually unlimited 
discretion to impanel jurors of their own choosing.”203 By 
circumventing state sheriffs, federal marshals would have a 
“plenary power to dictate the compositions of federal 
juries.”204 This power would allow those marshals to 
“pervasively control the political, economic, and social 
composition of the federal juries.”205 Jones makes Friendly’s 
“vague” idea that federal courts would be better more 
specific: “the Framers believed that the tight control 
maintained by federal officials over the selection of juries in 
federal courts would transform the federal courts into a 
superior forum, i.e., one that was more aligned with the 
  
 199. See 5 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87, at 159.  
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Jones, supra note 22, at 1003.  
 203. Id. at 1004. 
 204. Id.  
 205. Id. 
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values and perspectives of the Framers than the state 
courts.”206  
Jones’s view is consistent with the difficulties the 
Framers faced reviewing verdicts by juries in prominent 
Prize Cases. Yet Jones’s account perhaps overly diminishes 
the role of the judge in the inferior courts. Judges, too, had to 
be chosen carefully. The judges of the colonial era were 
generally not learned men of the law. Early America simply 
lacked well-trained lawyers, and there was little difference 
between juries and the judges who oversaw them.207 It was, 
as Anton-Hermann Chroust has said, “necessary and, in 
some places, considered even advisable, to resort to judges 
not familiar with the law.”208 This was “especially true in the 
lower courts;” but even state supreme courts “also had their 
share of incompetent and often ill-tempered laymen.”209 
Although juries did have more power than they do today, they 
were not self-directed. Prize Case litigants like Aaron 
Lopez—who suffered a judge sending a jury back three times 
before receiving the answer the judge wanted—knew that 
even unbiased juries could be thwarted at the hands of a 
biased judge.210  
The Framers therefore would have seen the power to 
appoint learned judges on a federal salary and with life 
tenure on the bench as another way to mitigate geographic 
bias. Congress had already shown its willingness to appoint 
serious lawyers to the Court of Appeals in Cases of 
Capture.211 One judge, William Paca, had practiced law in the 
  
 206. Id. at 1005.  
 207. See BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN 
EARLY CONNECTICUT 71 (1987) (“In background, experiences, and outlook,” Mann 
has argued, “[juries] were much like the litigants whose disputes they 
determined, and not very different from the judges who oversaw them.”). 
 208. Anton-Hermann Chroust, The Legal Profession in Colonial America, 33 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 57 (1957). 
 209. Id. 
 210. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text. 
 211. Congress had initially appointed George Wythe, arguably the first law 
professor, and Titus Hosmer, a prominent lawyer who had gone to Yale, to the 
Court, but Wythe declined and Hosmer died before he could take office. See 
BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 116-17. 
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Inner Temple in London before entering the Maryland bar, 
and had been the chief judge of the Maryland General 
Court.212 Cyrus Griffin had studied at Edinburgh and the 
Middle Temple.213 George Read had a longstanding legal 
practice in Philadelphia, sometimes acting as a lawyer in 
Prize Cases.214 John Lowell had been to Harvard and studied 
law in a leading office in Massachusetts.215 Appellate or 
otherwise, judges like these—staffing a federal court and 
paid by the United States—would presumably be more 
disciplined to the law and less accountable to local biases.  
C. Enforcing Federal Court Decisions 
Well-trained judges loyal to federal interests would, too, 
be more likely to actually enforce an appellate decision—a 
courtesy the state judges did not always afford to the 
Committee or Court of Appeals. The Prize Case experience 
taught that even if the Supreme Court could overrule biased 
jury decisions in diversity suits, that power would be hollow 
without the ability to execute its decisions. Winning an 
appeal is one thing; getting cash (or ship and cargo) in hand 
is another. The Committee on Appeals, and later the Court of 
Appeals, were dependent on the officials of state admiralty 
courts—the very courts whose judgments they were 
overturning—to carry out their judgments.216 Although states 
frequently implemented appellate rulings with no 
  
 212. Id. at 117. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 120. 
 215. Id. at 121. 
 216. GREENE, supra note 44, at 563 (“The absence of a federal judiciary made 
Congress dependent on the state courts for the enforcement of its will on 
individual citizens, and this illustrates the fundamental weakness of the 
Confederation. So far as the individual was concerned, his primary allegiance was 
to the state in which he lived and the federal government could not reach him 
directly. Congress could make a treaty, but its enforcement depended on the 
efficiency and good will of state governments.”); see also BOURGUIGNON, supra note 
16, at 317-18 (explaining that “the political realities repeatedly frustrated 
congressional efforts to execute the decrees of its court of prize appeals. If a state 
government or state court stuck to its determination to negate the effectiveness 
of these appellate decrees, Congress had no weapons in its scanty arsenal of 
powers to compel compliance.”). 
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objection,217 they flagrantly refused to enforce several of the 
most controversial Prize Case decisions.  
James Wilson, a lawyer in at least six cases before the 
Committee or the Court,218 was perhaps more aware of the 
difficulties of enforcing the Prize Case appeals than any other 
Framer. Recall that Wilson was one of the appellate lawyers 
in the case of the Lusanna,219 in which New Hampshire 
refused to enforce the Court of Appeals’ decision a dozen 
years after the appellate court had handed down its 
decision.220 Similarly, Wilson was Aaron Lopez’s lawyer in his 
longstanding battle to have his decision enforced in 
Connecticut.221 Wilson had surmised, after Lopez prevailed 
on appeal, that the merchant might face difficulties enforcing 
a favorable decision, warning Lopez that “some efforts might 
be taken in Connecticut to prevent him from obtaining the 
full effect of the decree of the Court of Appeals.”222 This was 
an understatement; it took Lopez nearly three years and two 
more court cases in Connecticut to have his judgment 
enforced.223 
But no case better illustrates Wilson’s firsthand 
experience of enforcement difficulties than the Olmstead 
case, in which another state—this time, Pennsylvania—
refused to give effect to a Committee on Appeals judgment.224 
  
 217. Holt, Invention of the Federal Courts, supra note 24, at 1427 n.13 
(criticizing Bourguignon for his “failure to indicate the degree and promptness of 
enforcement by state courts of most decrees of the federal admiralty appeals 
courts, . . .”). Nevertheless, in the cases that would have been known to most 
Congressmen, such as the Olmstead case, enforcement difficulties were 
pronounced. 
 218. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 329. 
 219. See supra text accompanying notes 136-68. 
 220. See Penhallow v. Doane’s Adm’rs, 3 U.S. 54, 80-82, 85 (1795) (holding that 
the decisions of the Court of Appeals were binding on the states). 
 221. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 226. 
 222. Id. While Bourguignon frames this as evidence that the admiralty courts 
executed decrees of the appellate court “as a matter of course,” Wilson’s letter, 
which describes Wilson’s desire to know if there are any difficulties so that “he 
could let Congress know,” seems to indicate otherwise. Id.  
 223. Friedman, supra note 155, at 113. 
 224. Olmstead is a case which, one historian has said, “displays all the inherent 
qualities of a romance, and its scenes are crowded with the most distinguished 
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In 1778, Gideon Olmstead, a Connecticut fisherman, was 
taken prisoner along with his crew by a British ship, the 
Active.225 The Active was sailing to New York with arms and 
supplies for the British army, and Olmstead was forced to 
assist in the navigation.226 Remarkably, Olmstead and his 
crew, though outnumbered three to one, overcame their 
British captors in a fierce battle and took the ship as their 
own.227 Olmstead set sail for New Jersey with what he now 
believed was his prize.228  
As the newly-captured Active neared the shore, an 
American privateer ship—the Convention—seized the Active 
after a chase and a fight.229 The Convention was owned and 
outfitted by the state of Pennsylvania, and was assisted in 
the capture by another privateering ship it was sailing with, 
the Le Gerard; together, all three ships then sailed for 
Philadelphia.230 The privateers of the Convention, with those 
of the Le Gerard, now claimed the Active as their own prize.231 
  
personages, who are arrayed against each other in situations which are highly 
dramatic.” Hampton Carson, The Case of the Sloop ‘Active,’ 15 PENN. MAG. HIST. 
& BIO. 385, 386 (1892). 
 225. Id. For additional details of the facts, see KELLY, supra note 46; William O. 
Douglas, Interposition and the Peters Case 1778-1809, 9 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1956); 
Kenneth W. Treacy, The Olmstead Case, 1778-1809, 10 W. POL. Q. 675 (1957). 
 226. Carson, supra note 224, at 386. 
 227. Id. The facts of Olmstead’s takeover are even more gripping than his 
contentious court battle. Olmstead and his outnumbered crew managed to rise 
and take over the ship, locking the crew of the Active in the “hatches.” Not giving 
up easily, the British melted spoons into bullets and forced them up the hatches. 
Ultimately, Olmstead, regained control, but the British captain “cut a hole 
through the stern and wedged the rudder so as to prevent Olmstead from 
steering” only giving up when forced by hunger and thirst. Id. at 387.  
 228. Although Olmstead wasn’t commissioned as a privateer, this does not seem 
to have raised a problem in the courts. Bourguignon surmises that he may have 
based his claim on a congressional resolve that allowed non-commissioned ships 
to capture British ships where the capture was made “near the shores of any of 
these colonies, by the people of the country.” BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 103. 
 229. Treacy, supra note 225, at 675. 
 230. Id. at 675-76. 
 231. KELLY, supra note 46, at 36. 
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And it was quite a prize: the ship and its cargo were worth 
hundreds of thousands of pounds.232  
Although Connecticut resident Olmstead had already 
captured the ship before the Convention and the Le Gerard 
had arrived, the Pennsylvania jury233 gave just one-fourth of 
the prize to the outsider Olmstead and his companions. They 
awarded the remainder of the prize to the captain and crews 
of the Convention and the Le Gerard, who would share their 
awards with the jury’s home state of Pennsylvania.234 With 
Benedict Arnold235—himself a Connecticut native, providing 
the security for his appeal—Olmstead appealed to the 
Committee on Appeals, with James Wilson as his counsel.236 
The Committee, whose membership included Oliver 
Ellsworth,237 reversed the lower court’s ruling and awarded 
the full prize to Olmstead.238  
  
 232. Id. at 41, 151 n.39 (describing currency approximations). 
 233. See Carson, supra note 224, at 388 (explaining that the judge “found 
himself unable to overcome the local prejudices of the jury in favor of the mariners 
of their own State, . . .”). This case could be biased against Olmstead in more ways 
than one; Gary Rowe pointed out that “the Pennsylvania Packet, a leading 
Philadelphia newspaper, ran a long story before the trial describing the capture 
and based entirely on the disgruntled Captain Underwood’s version of events.” 
Gary D. Rowe, Constitutionalism in the Streets, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 401, 413 (2005). 
 234. BURTON ALVA KONKLE, GEORGE BRYAN AND THE CONSTITUTION OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 1731-1791, at 160 (William C. Campbell ed., 1922), available at 
https://archive.org/stream/georgebryanconst00konkuoft#page/n7/mode/2up. 
 235. Arnold, then military commander of Philadelphia, was not yet suspected of 
treason. M. Ruth Kelly gives a vivid description of Arnold’s involvement in the 
case, where he was already showing signs of trickery. When he was accused of 
advocating for Olmstead because he had a pecuniary interest, he responded in the 
newspaper, The Pennsylvania Packet, that he was interested in Olmstead’s case 
only because Olmstead and his men were “countrymen and neighbours” and were 
“in distress.” KELLY, supra note 46, at 46. But his investment was not a good one; 
the long case and lawyers cost a substantial amount of money, and he had to 
borrow money from the French consul, even trying to entice him to invest in the 
case. Id. Indeed, the case of the Active is blamed in part for driving Arnold to the 
“desperate measures” of treason. Id. 
 236. This Committee included William Henry Drayton, of South Carolina; John 
Henry, Jr., of Maryland; William Ellery, of Rhode Island; and Oliver Ellsworth, 
of Connecticut. Carson, supra note 224, at 388. 
 237. Id.  
 238. Id. at 388-89. 
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Yet Olmstead’s victory meant little without the means to 
enforce it. The ship was now in the custody of the 
Pennsylvania courts, and they alone had the power to execute 
the Committee’s decision. But according to Pennsylvania 
law, the Committee on Appeals could hear only questions of 
law; it could not review questions of fact.239 The Pennsylvania 
court wrote that it took “into consideration the decree of the 
court of appeals,” but after “mature consideration[,]” 
determined that that the jury’s finding of the facts stood and 
could not be reversed on appeal.240 Judge Ross241 of the 
Pennsylvania court then issued an order and warrant to his 
marshal to sell the cargo of the Active—the British ship—and 
bring the money into the court, in preparation for enforcing 
the jury’s verdict.242  
That same day, Olmstead appeared before the 
Committee on Appeals and pleaded with the Committee to 
issue an injunction directing the state marshal not to follow 
the order.243 The Committee issued the injunction, but the 
Pennsylvania marshal disregarded it, paying all of the money 
into the Pennsylvania court in staunch defiance of the 
Committee’s order.244 The marshal then cheekily sent the 
receipt from the Pennsylvania court to the Committee on 
Appeals.245  
  
 239. 9 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PA. FROM 1682-1801, at 279 (WM. Stanley Ray 
ed., 1903). As the Chief Justice of Pennsylvania explained it,  
The genius and spirit of the common law of England, which is law in 
Pennsylvania, will not suffer a sentence or judgment of the lowest Court, 
founded on a general verdict, to be controlled or reversed by the highest 
jurisdiction; unless for error in matter of law, apparent upon the face of 
the record.  
Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 Dall. 160, 163 (Pa. 1792). 
 240. United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 120 (1809). 
 241. Judge Ross was one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence. 
Carson, supra note 224, at 387-88. 
 242. Treacy, supra note 225, at 678. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Carson, supra note 224, at 389-90. 
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The Committee was enraged, but powerless. On January 
19, 1779, the Committee issued an order declaring that the 
“marshal of the court of admiralty of the state of 
Pennsylvania had absolutely and respectively refused 
obedience to the decree and writ regularly made in and 
issued from this court, to which they and each of them was 
bound to pay obedience.”246 The Committee (referring to itself 
as “the court”) was thus “unwilling to enter upon any 
proceedings for contempt, lest consequences might ensure at 
this juncture dangerous to the public peace of the United 
States . . . .”247 The Committee refused to proceed further, or 
hear any appeals “until the authority of this court be so 
settled as to give full efficacy to their decrees and process.”248 
The subtext was plain: any further action by the Committee 
might lead to civil war. 
Two months later, Congress purported to reassert the 
Committee’s jurisdiction to review factual questions as well 
as questions of law, stating that no finding of a jury or court 
could oust Congress of its appellate jurisdiction.249 The power 
of executing the law of nations fell within the rights of a 
sovereign, and the power to hear appeals was necessary to 
apply that law uniformly.250 Even though Olmstead was a 
domestic matter, Congress used it as an occasion to assert 
that failure to enforce its decisions would prevent Congress 
from satisfying the claims of foreign countries.251  
But without Pennsylvania’s cooperation, the resolutions 
lacked bite. On two occasions, Congress appointed 
committees to meet with a committee of the Pennsylvania 
legislature, but to little avail. Wilson and Lewis—along with 
several other members of Congress—suggested that 
  
 246. United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 122-23 (1809). 
 247. Id. at 123. 
 248. Id. 
 249. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 107. 
 250. See 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 61, at 509. 
Interestingly, it appears that this was “the only occasion on which a claim of 
‘sovereignty’ was officially made on behalf of the Continental Congress . . . .” 
Treacy, supra note 225, at 680. 
 251. Treacy, supra note 225, at 679. 
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Congress itself pay what was owed to Olmstead and charge 
it to Pennsylvania, but this proposal was sidelined.252 In the 
end, Pennsylvania and Congress could not agree.253 It was not 
until thirty years later that Olmstead got relief, this time in 
the Supreme Court.254 
Inspired in part by the Olmstead matter,255 in August of 
1779, a committee began planning for the freestanding Court 
of Appeals.256 The initial committee report called for dividing 
the United States into four districts, with a different Court of 
Appeals for each district.257 That proposal would have given 
each court more enforcement powers, including a marshal, 
and “all the powers of courts of record for fining and 
imprisoning for contempt and disobedience.”258 Further, the 
committee recommended that juries be abolished in Prize 
Cases.259 Interestingly, the committee plan would have 
deprived the appellate courts of jurisdiction in cases where 
the appellant was from the same state where the trial was 
held—the “converse” of diversity jurisdiction.260 Tweaked by 
motions and amendments, the bill eventually came up for a 
vote and failed in an even split.261  
After the failure of the initial plan for a Court of Appeals, 
Congress appointed a new committee—which included Oliver 
  
 252. See 16 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 273-74 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1780); see also 15 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 
1774-1789, at 1195-96 (Worthington Chauncey Ford. ed., 1780). As Wilson had 
represented Olmstead on appeal, it is difficult not to see this as a conflict of 
interest. 
 253. Treacy, supra note 225, at 680-82.  
 254. See United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 141 (1809).  
 255. Other factors, such as complaints from merchants, also likely inspired the 
Court. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. 
 256. GOEBEL, supra note 11, at 169. 
 257. Id.  
 258. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 114. 
 259. Id. at 116. Pennsylvania and South Carolina did pass a new law disposing 
of juries in admiralty cases, but the remainder of the states who used juries 
continued to do so. Id.  
 260. See 15 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, supra note 
252, at 1221. 
 261. GOEBEL, supra note 11, at 170.  
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Ellsworth—that proposed the more modest plan Congress 
ultimately adopted.262 Although the new plan also abolished 
juries, it failed to give the Court its own marshal or any 
powers of contempt.263 Instead, Congress only advised states 
to pass laws “directing the admiralty courts to carry into full 
and speedy execution the final decrees of the Court of 
Appeals.”264 
 Why would Congress—still embroiled in the difficulties 
of enforcing the Olmstead case—fail to give its new Court the 
power to remedy one of the Committee’s most obvious 
shortcomings? Although the Articles of Confederation, 
approved by Congress in 1777, had provided Congress the 
power to establish courts for determining appeals in cases of 
capture, the Articles were not ratified until 1781—after the 
Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture had already been 
established.265 Congress, well aware of the fragile state of the 
Confederacy, likely felt that it did not have a “clear 
constitutional mandate” to establish the court, and was 
therefore hesitant to consolidate its power.266 
In 1781, however, Madison raised the issue again, 
seeking to give the new prize court the ability to enforce its 
decisions. Madison proposed resolutions recommending that 
that “the states be called upon to order their respective 
marshals to carry into immediate execution of the decrees of 
judgment of the said Court under the penalty of 
dismission . . . and action for damages in the Courts of 
common law at the suit of the party injured.”267 He cast about 
for anything that might make the judges appear more 
authoritative; one of his proposed resolutions required that 
the judges be “complimented with a black robe by the United 
States as proper to appear in during the sitting of the 
  
 262. Id. at 170-71. 
 263. Id. 
 264. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 115. For more background on the founding 
of the Court of Appeals, see supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. 
 265. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 115.  
 266. Id. 
 267. 19 JOURNALS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 374-75 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1781). 
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Courts.”268 A committee studying Madison’s proposals would 
have extended the Court’s jurisdiction even further, giving 
the Court the power of contempt and to appoint marshals.269 
But Congress again declined to adopt resolutions granting 
the Court more authority, ultimately granting the Court no 
more authority than it already had.270 
Yet many of Madison’s ideas for the Court of Appeals 
were later recycled in the Constitution and the Judiciary Act. 
For example, the Judiciary Act created the office of the 
federal marshal, granting the marshal the power to “execute 
throughout the District, all lawful precepts directed to him, 
and issued under the authority of the United States.”271 These 
concerns about the lack of federal marshals loyal to the 
national judiciary were underscored by the Prize Case 
experience. As the Olmstead case illustrated, state marshals 
naturally felt more allegiance to the state court than to a 
congressional appellate body; in the face of conflicting 
rulings, the marshal would obey the government who paid 
his salary.272 Unsurprisingly, the appointment of federal 
marshals was another means of ensuring that the federal 
courts made up for the shortcomings of the Court of Appeals. 
In addition, the allowance for inferior courts in the 
Constitution helped mitigate the enforcement difficulties the 
Framers had faced in the Prize Cases. The competing option 
for inferior courts at the Convention had been proposals to 
keep the state courts as the “inferior courts” of the Supreme 
Court, an idea that carried until Madison proposed giving 
Congress the power to decide.273 But with inferior federal 
  
 268. Id. at 375.  
 269. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 129.  
 270. Id. 
 271. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 73, 87. 
 272. See GOEBEL, supra note 11, at 159 (noting that “[t]here is no evidence that 
Congress undertook in any appeal to enlist the marshals of the state courts to 
execute its orders.”). 
 273. The Paterson plan presented at the Constitutional Convention, for 
example, left litigation at the trial level to the state courts. 1 Farrand, Records, 
supra note 86, at 20-21; see also Frank, Historical Bases, supra note 12, at 10 
(explaining that “there was strong sentiment in the Convention to leave all 
litigation at the trial stage to the state courts”). 
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courts, the Framers would not have to rely on state courts to 
execute their decisions; the lower courts, buttressed by 
federal marshals, could act without the states needing to be 
involved at all. In addition to allowing federal control over 
both judges and juries, inferior federal courts offered the 
opportunity for the federal government to have complete 
control over the enforcement of its decisions—a key 
requirement for making diversity jurisdiction work. 
This emphasis on control and enforcement helps resolve 
at least one puzzle of diversity jurisdiction: if diversity 
jurisdiction was intended to alleviate geographic bias, why 
did the first Congress allow a plaintiff in a diversity suit to 
file in federal court in his home state?274 Presumably, a 
plaintiff would get a fair hearing—or better—in his own state 
courts. The enforcement difficulties Congress grappled with 
during the Prize Cases provide one clue. In the absence of 
inferior federal courts, a plaintiff may trust his home state 
courts to decide the disputes, and indeed prefer his home 
state court against an out-of-state or foreign litigant. But if 
he wins in his home court, he may still need to execute the 
decision against his opponent in the opponent’s home state. 
Offering that plaintiff the option of a federal forum in his own 
home state erases these difficulties; an interstate community 
of federal marshals assists in the enforcement of a decision 
outside his state if he prevails. 
Arguably, the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit 
Clause should have remedied any enforcement concerns, by 
requiring the states to routinely enforce each other’s 
  
 274. Robert Jones lays out the puzzle: “[t]he logic of the ‘impartiality’ 
justification is that out-of-state parties would suffer from state court bias in favor 
of in-state parties.” Jones, supra note 22, at 1006. Therefore, it makes sense that 
an out-of-state party can remove to federal court to protect against bias from the 
home jury. “Conversely,” Jones suggests, “one would not expect the in-state 
party—who would likely benefit from the purported bias—to be able to invoke 
diversity jurisdiction.” Id. “In-state parties—the supposed beneficiaries of ‘local 
prejudice’ in the state courts—were thus allowed to invoke federal jurisdiction 
when suing or defending against an out-of-state party.” Id. The question is: why? 
Judge Posner, among others, offered the reason that geographic bias must have 
played a lesser role in the minds of the Framers. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 141 (1985). We argue, however, that 
permitting in-state parties to invoke federal jurisdiction is consistent with the 
geographic bias theory. 
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judgments.275 But although the modern understanding of the 
Clause is that—as the Supreme Court has said—a judgment 
in a state court “gains nationwide force[,]”276 this was not 
likely the understanding of the clause at the Founding.  
Recall that the Full Faith and Credit Clause in Article 
IV, § 1 has two parts. The first part provides that “Full 
[F]aith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State.”277 
This first, self-executing sentence of the Clause, Stephen 
Sachs has argued, “was evidentiary in nature: it obliged 
states to admit sister-state records into evidence but did not 
mandate the substantive effect those records should have.”278 
In other words, states were merely required to admit the 
judgment into evidence, not enforce it as they would their 
own decisions. This view is consistent with the 
understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in the 
Articles of Confederation, which again, did not 
“contemplate[ ] anything like interstate res judicata.”279 
The second part of the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
allows Congress to “prescribe the Manner in which such acts, 
records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect 
thereof.”280 But this too does not suggest that the Framers 
had more sweeping intentions for the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. Sachs argues that even when the First Congress 
passed a statute under this clause, “there is substantial 
evidence that the Act’s central purpose was to declare the 
mode of authentication”—or, in other words, the way the 
  
 275. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1. 
 276. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998).  
 277. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1. 
 278. Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 1201, 1206 (2009); see also David E. Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and 
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more than evidentiary sufficiency . . .”). 
 279. Engdahl, supra note 278, at 1610 (2009). The Articles of Confederation 
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documents should be presented to the court.281 Not everyone 
agrees with this narrow view of what the initial clause 
meant,282 but the lack of clarity gives reason to doubt that the 
Framers foresaw that states would henceforth automatically 
enforce each other’s judgments. Placing diversity jurisdiction 
in the inferior courts, and accompanying those courts with a 
national network of federal marshals, was a far more reliable 
means than the Full Faith and Credit Clause of enforcing 
judgments in interstate litigation. 
In short, the Prize Cases taught the Framers important 
lessons about how federal courts with diversity jurisdiction 
could mitigate the geographic bias they encountered in the 
Prize Cases, lessons whose influence went beyond the 
Constitution to the Judiciary Act. By granting the Supreme 
Court broad jurisdiction over issues of fact, ensuring control 
over federal judges and juries, and providing that the federal 
courts had the power to enforce its decisions, the Framers 
used their own judicial experience to devise a formula for a 
federal jurisdiction that would avoid the mistakes of the past. 
IV. WHY THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRIZE CASES EXTENDS 
BEYOND ADMIRALTY 
Did the Prize Cases—a seemingly obscure genre of 
litigation—actually exercise this level of influence over the 
Framers? Scholars who have shown awareness of bias in the 
Prize Cases have generally thought not. Friendly, for 
example,283 claimed that the influence of the Cases was 
limited to inspiring federal court jurisdiction over admiralty 
cases.284 Like Friendly, scholars of the sources of diversity 
  
 281. Sachs, supra note 278, at 1233. 
 282. See Jeffrey M. Schmitt, A Historical Reassessment of Full Faith and Credit, 
20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 485, 485 (2013) (arguing that “the command given to the 
states in the Full Faith and Credit Clause was originally understood to be robust 
and meaningful.”). 
 283. Friendly, supra note 3, at 484 n.6, 500.  
 284. As Holt summarizes, contemporaries “presumably understood the 
problems of localism that the national experience with admiralty had presented 
during the Confederation and shared the general attitude of 1789 that admiralty 
jurisdiction should be an exclusively national matter.” Holt, The Invention of the 
Federal Courts, supra note 24, at 1430. 
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jurisdiction have assumed that the problems faced in the 
Prize Cases arose solely from the unusual nature of 
admiralty litigation.285  
But why limit the analysis to admiralty alone? First of 
all, the Framers—surely to their annoyance—were 
intimately aware of the problems of bias the Prize Cases 
raised. Ellsworth, the drafter of the Judiciary Act and future 
Supreme Court Justice, was one of the Framers’ most 
involved members in the Prize Cases. Ellsworth had 
adjudicated nine cases286 and actively helped establish the 
Court of Appeals;287 he also presented a report to Congress 
condemning Pennsylvania in the Olmstead case. Wilson, also 
a Supreme Court Justice, was the acknowledged leader of the 
Committee of Detail at the Convention, which revised the 
Constitution; the “ten days of the [the Committee of Detail’s] 
deliberations are . . . in certain respects perhaps the most 
important episode of the entire Convention.”288 Therefore, the 
same man who re-drafted the Constitution acted as a lawyer 
in six Prize Cases, and as a judge in at least ten;289 the Court 
  
 285. Indeed, at least one of the Framers did think that the Prize Cases were 
anomalies. During the debates on the Judiciary Act, Samuel Livermore sought to 
limit federal court jurisdiction to admiralty, arguing that 
we have supported the Union for thirteen or fourteen years without such 
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Congress have always had ample justice done in all their claim; at least 
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Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early 
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REV. 1515, 1534 (1986). Even this opponent of broad jurisdiction recognized the 
defects in the Prize Cases. 
 286. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 329. 
 287. See William Garrott Brown, A Continental Congressman: Oliver Ellsworth 
1777-1783, 10 AM. HIST. REV. 751, 761 (1905) (“By his share in creating [the Court 
of Appeals in Cases of Capture] Ellsworth—no doubt unwittingly—had been 
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PA. J. CONST. L. 901, 931 (2008). 
 289. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 329. 
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of Appeals in Cases of Capture was partly his idea. Edmund 
Randolph, whose proposal for the judiciary was the only to 
specify that the federal judiciary should have jurisdiction 
over suits between citizens of different states, had also been 
involved in a number of appeals. Although Madison did not 
adjudicate any prize appeals, he did initiate attempts to 
reinforce the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals when state 
courts refused to give effect to its decisions.290  
And indeed, every member of Congress must, at some 
point, have been aware of the Prize Cases and the issues they 
raised. Over the course of the forty-two appeals heard when 
the Committee was active, thirty-seven members of Congress 
sat on the Committee of Appeals.291 And the entire Congress 
would have been aware of problems in the Prize Cases, even 
if not directly involved with the Committee. For example, 
Congress debated a resolution bolstering the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Appeals for two days.292 And while not every 
member of the Constitutional Convention was on the 
Continental Congress, at least forty out of the fifty-five 
men—and likely more—would have been at least made 
aware of the Court’s problems.293 
It therefore seems unlikely that Congress cabined its 
Prize Case experience to admiralty. Many of the same 
concerns that justified federal admiralty jurisdiction also 
applied to diversity cases. At the Convention, James Wilson 
said that “admiralty jurisdiction ought to be given wholly to 
the national Government, as it related to cases not within the 
jurisdiction of particular states, [and] to a scene in which 
controversies with foreigners would be most likely to 
  
 290. See supra notes 267-70 and accompanying text. 
 291. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 90. 
 292. See Brown, supra note 287, at 760. 
 293. See Teiser, supra note 28, at 415 (“It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, 
that forty of the delegates participating in the framing of the Constitution, or 
about four-fifths of them, were more or less intimately familiar with the 
functioning of the Committee on Appeals of Congress and with its successor the 
Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture.”). 
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happen.”294 The need to regulate disputes involving 
foreigners, and between citizens of different states, counseled 
in favor of placing both admiralty and diversity in the federal 
courts. 
Moreover, proposals similar to diversity jurisdiction first 
arose in discussions over the Prize Cases. Recall that when 
Congress first set up the Court of Appeals in Cases of 
Capture, it was initially proposed that the Court would not 
have jurisdiction if a “[p]arty who prays an appeal be a 
subject or inhabitant of the State where the trial was had in 
the Court of Admiralty.”295 Similarly, when the report was 
debated in Congress, a new proposal was made to oust 
appellate jurisdiction “in any case where all the parties 
concerned are citizens of one and the same State, unless 
allowed by the legislature of the said State.”296 Members of 
Congress were already thinking about diversity jurisdiction, 
albeit in the converse; rather than granting jurisdiction over 
cases between citizens of different states and foreigners, they 
considered exempting appeals from those whose trial took 
place in their home state, or cases where both parties were 
from the same state. These proposals failed to pass,297 but 
they show that the Congressmen were thinking about 
geography as an element in determining federal jurisdiction 
long before the drafting of the Constitution. 
Furthermore, to the extent the Framers were concerned 
about the viability of commercial litigation, the Prize Cases 
offered the best available evidence of what interstate 
commercial litigation might look like in the new United 
States. Before the War, there was, as John Frank has pointed 
out, “too little significant interstate business litigation to give 
room for serious actual abrasion.”298 But the Prize Cases 
were, in many ways, similar to ordinary commercial 
litigation between diverse parties: both commercial litigation 
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 295. 15 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 252, at 1221. 
 296. 16 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 252, at 29. 
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and the Prize Cases involved substantial sums of money. The 
Prize Cases dangled thousands of pounds before privateers 
at a time when Americans—and the colonies that stood to 
gain from the capture—were particularly cash-strapped. 
Whether or not the potential for interstate or international 
hostility was glaring in ordinary commercial litigation, it was 
obvious in the Prize Cases.  
The Prize Cases looked closer to commercial litigation 
than our admiralty cases of today in another key respect: the 
involvement of juries.299 Although admiralty cases are 
generally not decided by juries today,300 at the start of the 
Committee on Appeals, Congress was insistent on a right to 
a jury trial in a prize case. One of the key crimes of the British 
in the eyes of Americans before the War was that the British 
Vice-Admiralty courts did not use juries when adjudicating 
disputes over the hated trade regulations.301 For their part, 
the British did not believe that American juries could decide 
trade or taxation cases fairly. Before the Revolution, the 
colonial governor of Massachusetts, Francis Bernard, said 
that juries “‘in these causes were not to be trusted’” and that 
no one “‘will take upon him to declare, that at this time an 
American jury is impartial and indifferent enough, to 
determine equally upon frauds of trade.’”302 Acts granting 
admiralty courts increased powers “gave a larger jurisdiction 
to admiralty courts in America than had ever been given to 
  
 299. Lovejoy, supra note 54, at 465 (“Americans were distinguished from their 
cousins in England and were subject to a different judicial system—one that 
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difficulty over admiralty jurisdiction until after the French and Indian War when 
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 300. The Seventh Amendment jury trial right only applies to “[s]uits at common 
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 301. Lovejoy, supra note 54, at 462. 
 302. Id. at 468 (quoting Letter from Francis Bernard (Nov. 10, 1764), in SELECT 
LETTERS ON THE TRADE AND GOVERNMENT OF AMERICA 13, 16-17 (London, 1774)).  
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the same courts in England,” thus depriving Americans of 
jury trials in more cases than their British counterparts.303  
Presumably to remedy this flaw, the Continental 
Congress had initially required states to use juries in 
admiralty cases—making the cases look procedurally more 
like commercial cases than today’s admiralty cases.304 But 
although the juries in Prize Cases—as Matthew Harrington 
has said—“certainly neutralized much of the invective hurled 
against the old vice-admiralty courts,” Congress encountered 
a “whole new set of problems” when state court juries 
abandoned the principles of the law of nations in favor of 
bias.305  
So, there is ample circumstantial evidence that the Prize 
Cases motivated diversity jurisdiction. But why didn’t the 
Framers reveal the Cases’ influence in the debates? As 
described earlier, Wilson did use the Prize Cases to justify 
the grant of jurisdiction over law and fact in the Continental 
Congress.306 Yet there was so little debate on diversity at the 
Convention that not much was said about the justifications 
for diversity at all. And, arguably, the need for diversity was 
so obvious among those who had witnessed the federal-state 
struggles in the Prize Cases that it went without saying. 
When Madison said, “[w]e well know, sir, that foreigners can 
not get justice done them in these [state] courts,” perhaps 
“we well know” referred, at least in part, to a shared 
understanding of the difficulties in the Prize Cases.307  
  
 303. Id. at 462. 
 304. Later, they regretted this decision. See supra notes 255-64 and 
accompanying text.  
 305. Harrington, Economic Origins, supra note 178, at 177.  
 306. See supra Part III.A. 
 307. 3 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87, at 583. Robert Clinton has made this 
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judiciary. See Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 26, at 757 (“[T]he experience 
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Diversity jurisdiction was contentious, however, during 
the ratification debates, where the Federalists defended 
diversity as a means of mitigating geographic bias. The Prize 
Cases were mentioned at least once in this context to 
highlight jury bias. In the South Carolina ratification 
debates, General Charles Coatsworth Pinckney responded to 
concerns about the Constitution’s lack of an explicit right to 
a civil jury trial by referring to the Prize Cases. He explained 
that Congress had “passed an ordinance requiring all causes 
of capture to be decided by juries: this was contrary to the 
practice of all nations, and we knew it; but still an 
attachment to a trial by jury induced the experiment.”308 The 
experiment was a disaster. Pinckney noted that  
[t]he property of our friends was, at times, condemned 
indiscriminately with the property of our enemies, and the property 
of our citizens of one state by the juries of another. Some of our 
citizens have severely felt these inconveniences. Citizens of other 
states and other powers experienced similar misfortunes from this 
mode of trial.309 
 Therefore, he continued, Congress put juries aside in 
cases of capture, a decision it was only able to make because 
the right to jury trial was a resolution of Congress, and not a 
right guaranteed by the Articles of Confederation.310 
Pinckney used this example to show that it was unwise to 
give a sweeping right to a civil jury in every case in the 
Constitution, when “representatives of the people” would be 
better placed to decide the scope of the right.311 
Finally, the Prize Cases may not have been invoked more 
often because the Framers had to present their views to a 
broader audience. Though vitally important to the 
Revolution, the Prize Cases involved an obscure body of the 
law that “touched the lives of few people.”312 The Court’s 
decisions were unpopular with the states whose judgments 
  
 308. 4 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87, at 307.  
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 310. Id. at 307-08. 
 311. Id. at 308. 
 312. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 337. 
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were overruled,313 and the subject matter was “too arcane to 
catch the popular imagination.”314 Justifying the Diversity 
Clause with more abstract references to bias may have been 
more effective than invoking Congress’s judicial experience, 
an experience few knew about, and others hated. As Robert 
Jones has pointed out, the Framers were, after all, “skilled 
propagandists.”315 
V. DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AS A CRISIS-AVOIDING MEASURE 
The Prize Cases also taught that mitigating geographic 
bias through diversity jurisdiction, might, in fact, be 
essential to the nation’s survival. The Framers frequently 
faced situations where state court decisions evidencing bias 
against foreign countries could lead to crisis, and even war. 
For example, several Prize Cases threatened the fragile 
allegiances between the new Nation and France and Spain, 
countries the United States desperately needed as allies. 
From this experience, we conclude that the Framers learned 
that alienage jurisdiction—jurisdiction over “controversies 
. . . between . . . Citizens . . . and foreign States, Citizens or 
Subject,” which is often included under the broader umbrella 
of “diversity”—could avoid serious foreign confrontations. 
But they also learned that jurisdiction over disputes between 
citizens of different states could help avoid domestic crises 
that were consistently threatened in the new Republic.  
A.  Avoiding Foreign Wars 
Throughout the Revolutionary War, the Framers found 
themselves repeatedly entangled in Prize disputes with 
international dimensions.316 Juries were not just biased 
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against citizens of other states; foreigners lost out in state 
admiralty courts, too. Resolving international disputes on 
appeal became one of Congress’s primary roles in its judicial 
capacity on the Committee on Appeals, a role that was tinged 
with diplomacy. Consequently, when framing diversity 
jurisdiction, the members of the Convention were already 
well acquainted with the need for a federal forum not just for 
citizens of different states, but for aliens as well.  
The Framers knew that international conflicts could 
arise from unfairly adjudicated legal disputes. Poorly 
handled state court Prize decisions posed particular 
difficulties during the War, when Congress desperately 
needed allies. Early in the War, foreign nations complained 
about American privateers attacking neutral ships. 
Benjamin Franklin and the other American Commissioners 
in Paris sent out a circular to the states, warning that 
“[c]omplaint having been made of violences done by 
American armed vessels to neutral nations,” states must 
“respect the rights of neutrality . . . and treat all neutral ships 
with the utmost kindness and friendship for the honor of your 
country and of yourselves.”317  
Yet American privateers continued to attack neutral 
ships. Massachusetts was a repeat offender,318 embroiling 
Congress in numerous battles over the seizure of foreign 
ships. Because Massachusetts law initially precluded 
appeals to Congress, the Committee on Appeals was 
powerless in these cases. In 1779, for example, two Spanish 
ships were captured by Massachusetts privateers;319 although 
  
countries particularly helpful. The alliance with France was especially crucial for 
the privateering effort, as Greene says, because “[t]he commerce-destroying 
operations of the American navy and American privateers could now be carried 
on freely from French ports, unhampered by neutrality regulations.” GREENE, 
supra note 44, at 491.  
 317. Letter from Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane & Arthur Lee to Captains of 
American Armed Vessels (Nov. 21, 1777), in 2 REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC
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 318. To be fair to Massachusetts, it adjudicated the bulk of Prize Cases during 
the War, which is perhaps one reason why it ran into so many disputes with 
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 319. Bias might have been particularly prevalent against the Spanish, who had 
angered the Americans by allowing the British to resupply their troops in New 
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the Massachusetts court adjudicated one of the ships as 
neutral, it condemned the cargos of both ships as British 
property.320 The Spanish minister, through the French 
minister, Conrad Alexandre Gerard, conveyed to Congress 
that he sought “to obtain all the satisfaction due to the honor 
of the flag of his Catholic majesty, his master,” in enforcing 
the treaty of alliance and commerce between Spain and 
America.321 (He also requested that judges be “punished who 
have unjustly condemned and sentenced as a lawful prize the 
said cargo . . . .”322) 
In response to the Spanish complaint, a congressional 
committee noted that “it is very difficult for injured 
Foreigners to obtain redress in [s]uch cases as the present by 
a due court of law,” and suggested that Congress “take the 
most effectual measures” to have the privateers repay the 
owners of the captured ships.323 Congress also responded to 
the French minister, reassuring him that the United States 
would follow the law of nations, but at the same time 
explaining that it could not interfere with the court process.324 
Tellingly, Congress also deleted several paragraphs from its 
first draft of the letter explaining the difficulties the newly 
federal appeals system was having.325 At Congress’s 
encouragement, Massachusetts did pass an act allowing 
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appeals to Congress where the owners of the captured ship 
claimed it was from a friendly nation.326 
But that was not the end of the international conflicts. In 
1781, a Massachusetts privateering ship, the Sally, captured 
a Portuguese ship, Nostra Seigniora da Solidade e St. Miguel 
e Almas.327 Ultimately, a jury awarded the ship to the 
Portuguese, but the cargo to the Americans.328 The Court of 
Appeals ruled that the ship and cargo both belonged to the 
Portuguese, yet the Portuguese were still unable to get their 
ship back.329  
The next year, another Massachusetts privateer 
captured a Spanish ship below New Orleans, the St. Antonio, 
even though it was flying neutral flags.330 The Massachusetts 
privateers brought the ship from New Orleans to Boston,331 
violating the general rule that ships should be libeled at a 
convenient port,332 likely aware of the favorable treatment 
they would receive in their home state of Massachusetts. In 
Boston, where the ship was libeled, the state court upheld the 
capture;333 the Court of Appeals reversed.334 The privateers 
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 327. Id. at 230. 
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 329. Id. The Portuguese ship did eventually receive some partial enforcement of 
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who had captured the Spanish ship then wrote to Congress, 
claiming that the appellate decision was prejudiced by letters 
from the Spanish officials, and requesting a rehearing.335 
Around the same time, Congress learned from the Spanish 
that Massachusetts was refusing to enforce the Court of 
Appeals’ decision in the St. Antonio case.336 A committee of 
Congress determined that the privateers’ complaint had no 
merit, but there was little Congress could do.337 Congress 
could again only recommend to Massachusetts that it respect 
the Committee on Appeals’ decision.338 It is unclear whether 
the owners of the Spanish ships ever had their decision 
enforced.339 
This kind of bias against foreign parties, exacerbated by 
the state courts’ refusal to enforce federal appellate 
decisions, was a particular problem throughout the Prize 
Cases. These cases exposed the Framers to the prospect of 
international strife resulting from biased state court 
decisions. In the constitutional debates, the Federalists 
emphasized that the proposed federal courts would be a safe 
place for international disputes. Madison said at the 
Constitutional Convention: “[a]s our intercourse with foreign 
nations will be affected by decisions of this kind, they ought 
to be uniform. This can only be done by giving the federal 
judiciary exclusive jurisdiction.”340 John Jay argued that, in 
a federal judiciary, treaties and “laws of nations, will always 
be expounded in one sense, and executed in the same 
manner,” unlike the state courts where the decisions of the 
“thirteen States . . . will not always accord or be consistent;” 
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particularly as they might be affected by “different local laws 
and interests.”341  
The Prize Case experience also warned that the shoddy 
application of international law by undiplomatic state 
institutions342 could have disastrous consequences. 
Jurisdiction over alienage cases was essential to maintaining 
friendly diplomatic relations and avoiding foreign wars. 
When speaking of alienage jurisdiction, Madison asked, 
“[c]ould there be a more favorable or eligible provision to 
avoid controversies with foreign powers? Ought it to be put 
in the power of a member of the union to drag the whole 
community into war?”343 The Framers invoked this fear of 
war explicitly in the debates. Hamilton wrote in The 
Federalist Papers that federal jurisdiction over “all causes in 
which the citizens of other countries are concerned” was 
essential to the “public faith” and “the security of the public 
tranquility.”344 James Wilson also defended alienage 
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jurisdiction as a way to “preserve peace with foreign 
nations.”345 
This view of alienage jurisdiction as a crisis-avoiding 
measure is consistent with another justification for alienage: 
assuaging foreign creditors. Wythe Holt focuses on the 
colonists’ enormous debts to British creditors in the post-
Revolutionary War period as the source of alienage 
jurisdiction.346 Because of a mixture of British hostility and 
financial insolvency, Holt points out, “every state legislature 
during, and several after, the [W]ar passed at least some kind 
of statute restricting the power of at least some British 
creditors to collect.”347 State courts followed the legislatures, 
too, and refused to hear cases from British creditors during 
the War.348 British merchants were “amazed”349 that the 
Americans were refusing to abide by Article IV of the Treaty 
of Paris, which provided that creditors would “‘meet with no 
lawful impediment’” in claiming their debts.350 Establishing 
national courts that were free from biased state institutions 
was the solution.351 Following the passage of the Judiciary 
Act, “British creditors immediately began filing cases in the 
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national courts in what southerners thought was a flood, but 
which to the merchants was merely a trickle.”352  
The Prize Case experience naturally overlaps with the 
Framers’ concerns about foreign creditors’ ability to collect 
their debts. Both in the Prize Cases and in disputes with 
British creditors over the states’ disregard for Article IV of 
the Treaty of Paris, the Framers found it difficult to secure 
compliance with the nation’s international obligations, or 
treat international disputes uniformly. Seemingly local 
events with individual foreign citizens could take on an 
international dimension, just as failure to pay foreign debts 
might, as Holt warns, “embroil the weak fledgling nation in 
war.”353  
B. Domestic War 
But Congress also feared a domestic war arising from 
Prize disputes. The dramatic end of the Olmstead case 
exemplifies that fear. Although these events admittedly 
happened after the ratification of the Constitution, they give 
credence to the concerns of the Framers and their 
contemporaries that inter-state disputes—like international 
disputes—could spiral into armed conflict.  
Though the Committee on Appeals had ruled in 
Olmstead’s favor in 1778 against the Pennsylvania 
privateers, Olmstead still had not received his prize by 
1790.354 After David Rittenhouse, the Pennsylvania state 
treasurer and celebrated astronomer, died, his heirs and 
executrices held the funds from the Active in the form of 
federal debt; they refused to give it to Olmstead.355 Olmstead 
won a default judgment in the Pennsylvania Court of 
Common Pleas, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
rejected his claim in 1792, arguing that the lower court 
lacked jurisdiction to issue a default in an admiralty case.356  
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 355. Id. at 6-9. 
 356. Id. at 7.  
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In 1803, Olmstead went instead to the new federal 
district court in Pennsylvania and obtained a decree against 
the heirs.357 But the Pennsylvania legislature sided with its 
state courts, rejecting the federal district court’s decision and 
declaring that the jurisdiction of the Committee on Appeals 
had been illegal and void.358 The legislators ordered the 
governor to use all means to protect Pennsylvania’s rights.359 
As Hampton Carson has written, the nominal parties to the 
controversy were Olmstead and Rittenhouse’s heirs—“an old 
man of eighty-two and two women who had inherited the 
lawsuit, but the real contestants were the State of 
Pennsylvania and the United States.”360 
Still empty-handed, Olmstead next took his case to the 
new United States Supreme Court, where Chief Justice 
Marshall upheld the authority of the congressional court.361 
Chief Justice Marshall granted an order of mandamus, and 
took the opportunity to reaffirm the dominance of the federal 
judiciary over the state. “If the legislatures of the several 
states may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the 
United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those 
judgments,” Marshall wrote, “the [C]onstitution itself 
becomes a solemn mockery.”362  
But, standing alone, the Chief Justice’s stern words were 
not enough to secure the primacy of the federal courts. The 
federal marshal sent to enforce the decision found 
Pennsylvania state militia under the command of General 
Bright, appointed by the governor to uphold the legislature’s 
pledge of protection to the Rittenhouse heirs.363 The marshal 
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 362. United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 136 (1809). Justice Marshall 
continued: “[s]o fatal a result must be deprecated by all; and the people of 
Pennsylvania, not less than the citizens of every other state, must feel a deep 
interest in resisting principles so destructive of the union, and in averting 
consequences so fatal to themselves.” Id.  
 363. Carson, supra note 224, at 395. 
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read his commission to the armed soldiers surrounding the 
house of the Rittenhouse women, but to no avail; the 
marshal’s attempts to enter the house were met with 
“pointed bayonets.”364 Eventually the marshal somehow 
devised a strategy to enter the house from the back door and 
serve his writ,365 and held the women captive. After a habeas 
corpus action to win the release of the women failed, the 
Pennsylvania legislature backed down, calling for a 
withdrawal of the militia, and the governor ultimately paid 
out the money for the ransom of the women.366 An uprising 
against federal authority was narrowly averted.  
General Bright and his armed soldiers who had 
threatened the marshal were put on trial for obstruction of 
justice367 and found guilty, but President Madison—who had 
been so closely involved with the Olmstead case thirty years 
before—commuted their sentences because they were acting 
under a “mistaken sense of duty.”368  
Thus, the same kinds of disputes that arose between 
Americans and foreigners also arose between citizens of 
different states. The threat of Civil War in the early years of 
the Republic was real. That the colonies would dissolve into 
civil war, if independent, had been a favorite “Tory 
argument.”369 This was in part because British creditors were 
not the only ones to suffer in the courts; American debtors 
did as well. Rhode Island was a particular villain, shutting 
down its courts to creditors both foreign and out-of-state 
alike, and in turn, its merchants were shut out of other 
states’ courts.370 At the North Carolina ratifying convention, 
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William Davie expressed the need for impartial courts so that 
“a debt may be recovered from the citizen of one state as soon 
as from the citizen of another.”371 A citizen of Massachusetts, 
he argued, “might be ruined” before he could recover a debt 
in Virginia.372  
Even apart from the grievances between the states, the 
United States lacked any role models for nations that 
functioned smoothly with a federal court system. In arguing 
for diversity jurisdiction, Hamilton had to reach back to 
fifteenth-century Germany for an example of a successful 
court system that functioned well in a federal nation.373 
Conflicts in the Prize Cases between states, or between the 
states and Congress, only reinforced this heavy feeling that 
Americans were not yet a unified nation. 
Given the threat of war from inside and out, it is not 
surprising that the Framers themselves might have seen 
diversity litigation as a way to maintain “national peace and 
harmony.” Four out of the five plans for the Constitution 
provided for alienage jurisdiction, but the Virginia 
Resolution was the only one that also included jurisdiction 
over disputes between “citizens of other states.”374 But when 
the plan became the focus of discussion at the Convention, 
the specific language was dropped, and replaced with a more 
general provision that the federal courts’ jurisdiction should 
extend to “‘all cases arising under the national laws and to 
such other questions as may involve the national peace and 
harmony.’”375 The Committee of Detail—made up of 
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Ellsworth and Wilson—again made the grant of jurisdiction 
more specific, replacing jurisdiction over issues involving the 
“national peace and harmony” with “controversies . . . 
between Citizens of different States, and between a State or 
the Citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or 
subjects.”376 “Thus,” Moore and Weckstein conclude, “it seems 
a fair inference that diversity as well as alienage jurisdiction 
were thought to be included within the general phrase 
‘questions as may involve the national peace and 
harmony.’”377 
This relationship between diversity jurisdiction and 
“national peace and harmony” might also help resolve what 
John Frank called a “mystery truly dark—why did the 
Congress of 1789 provide that appellate jurisdiction should 
be sufficient in federal question cases while there should be 
trial court jurisdiction in diversity cases?”378 Scholars have 
offered several theories. One theory is that diversity 
litigation would be more likely to invoke issues of fact rather 
than issues of law, and that factual issues would be more 
difficult to review without the unpopular means of overruling 
a jury decision.379 Others have compellingly argued that 
withholding federal question jurisdiction might have been 
part of a compromise between Federalists and Anti-
Federalists, who feared that the federal courts would absorb 
the state courts’ jurisdiction.380 
But the Framers’ desire to provide jurisdiction over cases 
involving the “national peace and harmony,” inspired in part 
by the Prize Case experience, might offer another clue as to 
why diversity was initially included in the inferior courts’ 
jurisdiction, where federal questions were not. The Prize 
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Cases taught that diversity cases were functionally federal 
question cases, and at the time, their placement in federal 
courts were deemed even more essential to the survival of the 
new country. Preserving the national peace and harmony—
whether threatened by disputes with foreign citizens, or 
citizens of other states—was an essential part of preserving 
the Nation itself. The Framers may have been just as 
concerned with these “federal questions” as they were with 
the ones we generally include within federal question 
jurisdiction today. 
CONCLUSION 
The Framers’ judicial experience in the Prize Cases is 
noticeably absent from the civil procedure or federal courts 
literature, and is rarely invoked when discussing the origins 
of the national judiciary. This Article has sought to correct 
this oversight, re-acquainting scholars with the influence of 
the Prize Cases, and focusing more specifically on the Cases’ 
influence on diversity jurisdiction. Viewing diversity 
litigation through the actual litigation experience of the 
Framers reveals why the need for a neutral forum for 
diversity disputes seemed so obvious at the time of the 
Convention, and might explain the lack of any debate on 
what were otherwise controversial propositions. The Prize 
Case experience also exemplified how a real threat of foreign 
and domestic war could arise from clumsily handled state 
court litigation. Above all else, the Prize Case experience 
rehabilitates the view that geographic bias was a driving 
force behind the grant of diversity jurisdiction to the federal 
courts.  
Thayer asked the question that sparked this Article, 
Friendly’s,381 and many others: why diversity litigation? 
Thayer’s article ultimately answered his own question. “It 
was because,” he wrote, “in controversies between its own 
citizens and those of other States or countries, it might be 
expected that the courts of any given State would not be free 
from bias.”382 Here, as so often, the simplest answer is also 
the most accurate. 
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